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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EU ENERGY SECURITY BEHAVIOR: EXPLORING THE 
CENTRAL MOTIVATION 
Balaban, Gökçe 
M.A, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Paul Williams 
October 2007 
 
This thesis aims to understand energy security behavior of the EU in the 
light of two IR theoretical stances: rationalism-neo-realism and constructivism. In 
order to do that, the study targets the question: “What is the central motivation of 
EU energy security policies- norms or interests- and how the different IR theories 
of rationalism-neo-realism and constructivism can interpret EU energy security 
policies differently”. Power and wealth being the most crucial, interest-based 
policies refer to the efforts that will promote the material interests, disregarding the 
normative considerations. Norm-based policies, on the other hand, represent the 
policies which are resulted from the identity, norms and political culture, and 
which are sometimes taken at the expense of the material interests. Thus, this 
thesis proposes two contradictory impulses- interests and norms- for EU energy 
security behaviour, and tries to understand which one is dominant in energy 
security decision-making process. Relying on official EU documents and on 
literature works, this study reaches to the conclusion that in environmental topics, 
the EU is strongly committed to the norms. However, in the topics considering the 
supply security such as guaranteeing the present and future energy supplies, and 
energy diversification- the EU follows more interest-based policies. In conclusion, 
although the EU is the most committed actor to environmental protection in the 
world, a fully normative approach is still lacking in EU energy security behavior.  
 
Keywords: Energy Security, EU, Interests, Norms, Neo-realism, Constructivism 
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ÖZET 
 
AB ENERJİ GÜVENLİĞİ DAVRANIŞI: TEMEL SEBEBİ İNCELEME 
Balaban, Gökçe 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr Paul Williams  
Ekim 2007 
 
  Bu  çalışma, AB’nin enerji güvenliği davranışını iki uluslararası ilişkiler 
teorisi ışığında anlamayı amaçlar: akılcı-neo-gerçekçilik ve inşacı kuram. Bunu 
gerçekleştirebilmek için, bu tez şu soruyu cevaplamayı hedefler: “AB enerji 
güvenliği politikaları arkasındaki temel dürtü normlar mıdır, yoksa çıkarlar mıdır 
ve akılcı-neo-gerçekcilik ve inşacı kuram AB’nin enerji güvenliği politikalarını 
nasıl yorumlar?” Güç ve zenginlik başlıcaları olmak üzere, çıkar bazlı politikalar 
normatif etkenleri gözardı ederek maddesel çıkarları destekleyen çabalara tekabül 
eder. Öte yandan, norm bazlı politikalar, kimlik, normlar ve siyasi kültürden 
kaynaklanan ve zaman zaman maddesel çıkarlar pahasına benimsenen politikaları 
yansıtır. Dolayısı ile, bu çalışma AB enerji güvenliği için iki zıt dürtü- çıkar ve 
norm- öne sürer ve enerji güvenliği karar alma sürecinde hangisinin baskın 
olduğunu anlamaya çalışır. Bu tez, AB resmi belgelerine ve literatürdeki 
kaynaklara dayanarak AB’nin çevresel konularda normlarına sıkı sıkıya bağlı 
olduğu sonucuna ulaşır. Fakat; şimdiki ve gelecekteki enerji arzını garantilemek, 
enerji kaynaklarını çeşitlendirmek gibi arz güvenliğini içeren konularda AB daha 
çıkar bazlı politikalar izler. Özet olarak, AB çevre konularında normlarına sıkı 
sıkıya bağlı olsa da, enerji güvenlik davranışında tümden normatif bir yaklaşım 
hala eksiktir. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Enerji Güvenliği, AB, Çıkarlar, Normlar, Akılcılık, Neo-
Gerçekçilik, İnşacı kuram 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 1.1 The Subject of the Study 
 
The EU is the largest energy importer and the second largest energy 
consumer in the world. Being a resource-poor region and a huge consumer makes 
the EU dependent on foreign supplies. At present, two-thirds of the consumed oil 
and gas, and half of the consumed energy in the Union are imported (Kalyuzhnova, 
2005: 60). It is expected that the share of imports in total consumption will increase 
to 70% in the next thirty years (Green Paper, 2006). If the current trends continue, 
the EU will import 60% of its gas only from Russia and 90% of its oil only from 
imports by 2030 (Euractive, 2007). 
Being overwhelmingly dependent on few resources- such as oil and gas, and 
on few suppliers- as with Russia in gas and the Middle East in oil, is an energy 
security problem for the EU, since this dependence carries the risks of unstable 
energy supply and higher energy prices, which have been identified as threats in the 
2006 Green Paper. To mitigate the risks associated with energy security, 
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diversification of resources and finding new suppliers seem to be the most 
appropriate policies in providing energy security.  
However, there are some normative considerations in the Union policies, 
which stand as potential obstacles against diversification of both resource and 
suppliers. For one thing, the EU has a strong commitment to protecting the 
environment by using environmentally friendly resources, which might prevent 
diversifying resources. As an example, coal emissions produce a high level of CO2, 
so its share of the total energy consumption of the Union should not be expected to 
increase unless clean-coal technologies are developed. Secondly, the EU has 
normative considerations in its foreign policy with respect to human rights, 
democracy, good neighborly relations, etc. As energy policy with other countries is 
a secondary topic of foreign policy, these normative ideas can be restrictive factors 
in diversifying suppliers since they might affect EU relations with potential 
importers. 
In short, there is a dichotomy in EU energy policy: on the one hand, there 
are security problems of being dependent on a few resources and suppliers, the 
effects of which could be manifested as irregular and unstable supplies and sharply 
volatile energy prices. As the EU Commission has underlined in the 2000 and 2006 
Green Papers, these problems can be mitigated by diversification of resource types 
and suppliers. On the other hand, the EU has normative considerations both in its 
energy policy, such as protecting the environment, and in its foreign policy, such as 
promoting human rights, democracy and good relations with its neighbors, which 
seem to contradict the above-mentioned policies that are intended to maximize the 
interests of the Union.  
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1.2 The Purpose, Theory, and Methodology of the Study 
 
 This study poses a puzzle about the energy security policies of EU: what is 
the central motivation behind the formulation of EU energy policy, given the 
somewhat contradictory impulses towards energy security, on the one hand, and in 
realizing normative goals of protecting the environment and promoting human 
rights, democracy and good governance on the other hand. Based on this puzzle, 
this study poses its research question as follows: “What is the central motivation of 
EU energy security policies- norms or interests- and how different IR theories of 
rationalism-neo-realism and constructivism can interpret EU energy security 
policies differently?” 
While protecting the environment is an internal policy norm (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006), protection of human rights, democracy and good governance are 
external, as well as internal, policy norms of the Union (Manners, 2002: 240-241; 
Manners, 2005: 11-12). The environment is related to energy because fossil fuel 
consumption emits high levels of CO2, which threatens the environment. The EU 
policies on the environment, thus, can best be understood by analyzing the EU’s 
consumption of resources and by looking at the efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. 
The foreign policy norms are related to energy policy in the foreign supplies of the 
EU- that is, whether the inability to comply with these norms by suppliers is a 
preventive factor in the EU’s imports. Thus, this study will explore the existence of 
the internal and external energy policies of the Union and will analyze whether 
internal and external norms of the EU in energy are applied to the determination of 
EU energy policy. The answer will shed more light on the EU’s energy security 
behavior: is it based on norms as well as interests, or is it solely based on interests? 
 4
At first, it might be hard to understand how policy concerning a material 
commodity such as energy could be explained instead by the independent influence 
of norms and values. Since decisions about energy reflect policies, and there are 
potentially multiple reasons behind certain policies, norms and values could be the 
main causal factor in energy policies. The approach, which will explain the role of 
norms in the security behavior of the actors in this study, will be constructivism. In 
constructivist literature norms are defined as “collective expectations about proper 
behavior for a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1996; Checkel, 1998; 
Farrell, 2002). As norms are “for a given identity”, norms are social practices and 
inter-subjective (Farrell, 2002: 49). Therefore they cannot be taken as given, or they 
cannot be the same for each actor. In other words, they are not imposed by the 
structure but are rather constructed by agents and structures. At the same time, 
norms also constitute agents and structures. Thus, norms are at the core of the social 
construction process and this is how they become important in decision-making. As 
the world is social for constructivism, and the norms are social practices and they 
constitute the agents, they also constitute and regulate the behavior of the agents 
(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 54). Moreover, norms do not only shape 
the identity of the actors, but they also shape their interests. As the interests are not 
independent of the social structures and social practices, norms “give interests their 
content and meaning”(Adler, 2000: 103). 
By contrast, rationalism and neo-realism would best explain the role of 
interests in the energy policy. Rationalism in IR, tries to put forward the reasons for 
the policies of the actors. Rationalism, based on rational-choice theory, claims that 
when faced with several courses of action, states (or actors) usually do what they 
believe is likely to have the best overall outcome (Ward, 2002: 25). During the 
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development of the IR field, “the best overall” outcome is usually associated with 
material interests (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 57) and that is why rationalism is 
linked to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which emphasize the role of material 
interests-power and wealth- in the foreign and security policy decision-making 
processes (Checkel, 1998: 326). Yet, neo-liberalism, unlike neo-realism, focuses on 
the role of the norms in decision-making process. Accordingly norms “are 
intervening variables between assumed interests and behavioral outcomes” 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 25). In other words, norms in neo-liberalism are used 
strategically to further self-interest (Katzenstein, 1996: 17). Thus, norms are used to 
reinforce the material interests in neo-liberalism, and from this perspective, neo-
liberalism differs from constructivism. Yet, despite the differences between the two 
approaches, to not create confusion in answering the research question of this study, 
neo-liberalism will be excluded from rationalism, and only neo-realism will be 
studied. For neo-realism norms, identities, beliefs and culture have “no independent 
explanatory power” and they are “at best derivative of the distribution of 
capabilities”(Katzenstein, 1996: 17). 
 Thus, when the research question of this study is posed in terms of central 
theoretical debates, it will be as follows: “How the different motivations of EU 
energy policy can be interpreted differently by IR theories of rationalism, neo- 
realism and constructivism?” This thesis is then based on the belief that the most 
appropriate theories to use in answering the research question of “Whether EU 
energy security is based on norms or interests” are constructivism and rationalism-
neo-realism. Therefore, this study will analyze and interpret the policies of the 
Union according to outcomes expected by constructivism and rationalism-neo-
realism. 
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As methodology, the thesis will rely mainly on the textual analysis. To 
understand the interests and rationales of the EU, official documents and papers will 
be analyzed. Moreover, critical review of the literature will allow for surveying and 
compiling different comments and interpretations of Union policies into an integral 
whole. The study will also utilize descriptive statistical data when analyzing the 
energy situation of the Union. 
 
 
1.3 Delimitation of the Study 
 
 This study treats the EU as a monolithic actor in energy policy, although in 
reality energy policies differ among member states. However, these national 
differences are not addressed in this study because the EU is seen by itself and by 
third parties as a single actor in energy policy. To explain why this is the case, a 
small discussion of EU “actorness” (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006) will be given 
here. 
 In international law, to be an actor is to have legal personality, which is 
accorded to recognized states. From that perspective, the EU, according to 
international law, does not have a legal personality since it cannot conclude 
international agreements. However, the interpretation of the international law is not 
sufficient to decide on actorness in international relations, since in practice an 
actor’s real identity may be sharply divergent from the legal understanding. 
 The rise of international organizations, corporations and institutions has 
created the necessity of rethinking the legal criteria of actorness. This study 
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assumes that the fundamental aspect of being an actor is others’ perceptions of the 
actor. In other words, if third parties consider an institution- not only the state- as an 
actor, the most important precondition of being an actor is satisfied. Moreover, the 
actor should also exhibit a degree of autonomy in relation to its external 
environment, and its internal constituents (Vogler and Bretherton, 2006: 16). In 
other words, an actor should be capable of formulating policy purposes and making 
decisions. In short, this study assumes that there should exist a shared understanding 
about actorness between third parties and the actor itself. 
 Under these circumstances, to comment on the manifestation or reproduction 
of EU actorness in its energy policy, it is necessary to examine the nature and extent 
of the shared understanding. For one thing, the Commission formulates the 
purposes of the Union’s energy policy by initiating policy and modifying proposals 
(Matlary, 1997: 137). This means that the Commission is able to craft the purposive 
character of the EU’s energy policy. Moreover, the EU is seen as an important 
global actor in energy by third parties. Many third parties consider the EU as a 
single actor rather than a loose collection of separate entities, when discussing their 
energy policies. The EU-Russia Dialogue and the energy policies under the 
European Neighborhood Policy(ENP) are both the examples of this. Moreover, an 
increasing number of studies in energy literature about EU energy policy also show 
how the academic world views the EU as a single actor in energy. 
 In conclusion, in this study, the EU will be treated as a monolithic actor in 
energy because it can take purposive actions by formulating policy and making 
decisions and because there is an overall acceptance of the EU as a global energy 
actor by third parties. 
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1.4 The Outline of the Study 
 
Chapter 2 accomplishes two tasks. First, it lays out EU definition of energy 
security. Second, it makes a brief analysis of Security Studies to give the general 
picture, before the in-depth analysis of rationalism/constructivism that will take 
place in Chapter 3. The analysis of Security Studies will also be helpful in 
understanding EU energy security discourse. This chapter will start with an analysis 
of the literature’s definition of energy security concept. After EU discourse on 
energy security is presented, it will be analyzed more closely to gain a clearer idea 
of what motivates EU energy security behavior. This task will be accomplished by 
relying on the brief analysis of Security Studies. The conclusion will indicate that 
the EU has a broadened security understanding in its energy security definition. The 
reasons for broadened security- whether based on norms or interests- and the 
policies to achieve this, which will be analyzed in Chapter 3, will be useful to 
resolve the puzzle laid out in this study. Thus, exploring the EU’s broadened energy 
security definition is the first step in understanding EU energy security behavior. 
One should also notice that, in this Chapter, only the energy security definition of 
the Union, rather than policies, will be given, since the latter is the topic of the 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 seeks to explore EU energy policies. In the first section of the 
chapter, the EU’s energy situation will be analyzed to better understand its policies. 
Next, official documents of the Union will be analyzed. There will be two foci here: 
one is the internal policies and policy objectives and the other is the external 
policies and policy objectives. The former aims to analyze the policies that the 
Commission has tried and is trying to achieve within the Union. Therefore, this task 
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can best be understood by analyzing Commission Green Papers of 2000 and 2006, 
which are the most appropriate discursive resources for comprehending the energy 
policies of the Union. In external policies, on the other hand, EU diversification 
efforts and bilateral relations with producer countries and regions will be given 
priority focus. In that sense, for the former, the EU’s projects to diversify its energy 
routes, the potential energy suppliers to the EU and the potential energy transport 
routes will be explored. For the latter, the EU-Russia summits along with the EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership Process and 
the ENP will generally present the best source of analysis to understand EU external 
energy policies. In sum, the aim of this Chapter is not to comment on or interpret 
policies, but only to describe their discourse. 
The main analysis of this study will take place in Chapter 4. Based on 
discussions of the policies described in Chapter 3, this chapter will concentrate on 
the motives- norms and interests- behind these policies and will aim to put forward 
which motive is dominant in EU energy policy. The theoretical debate informing 
the study will also be incorporated in this chapter. Having traced back the 
motivations, the chapter will interpret EU energy policy in the light of two IR 
theories: constructivism and rationalism-neo-realism.  
In the final part, this study reaches to the conclusion that in the policies 
concerning the environment, norms are dominant in EU energy security behavior. 
Indeed, in environmental protection, the EU sometimes takes decisions, which 
directly conflict with its material interests.  However, in the issues related to supply 
security, material interests are superior to norms, since the EU considers its material 
interests before its norms. Based on this assumption, from a constructivist 
perspective, the EU is strongly committed to its environmental norms in its energy 
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policy, and the environmental policies can be explained by constructivism. On the 
other hand, from a rationalist and neo-realist perspective, the EU thinks its material 
interests before its norms in its supply security. As a conclusion, while supply 
security policies of the Union’s energy policy can be explained by rationalism and 
neo-realism, environmental policies can be interpreted by constructivism. This also 
shows that, although the EU is the most committed actor in environmental 
protection in the world, a fully normative approach is lacking in EU energy security 
behavior. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EU ENERGY SECURITY DISCOURSE 
 
 
The first part of this chapter analyzes EU discourse on energy security. How 
the EU defines its energy security, what are the policy objectives of the EU in 
energy are the main questions that will be answered in the first part.  
The second part of the chapter makes a brief analysis of the Security Studies. 
Giving the general picture in Security Studies is necessary to better understand the 
IR theories of neo-realism and constructivism, which will take place in the final 
analysis. Relevant for security studies are the Cold War and the post-Cold War, 
with each belonging to different philosophical traditions. For the Cold War Security 
Studies the states are the main referent objects of the security and the Security 
Studies mainly focus on the study of threat, use and control of the military force 
(Smith, 2000: 35). However, after the Cold War, new security threats have been 
emerged. These new security threats are analyzed by the post-Cold War Security 
Studies through looking at the different referent-objects other than states, such as 
ethnic groups, individuals, women, environment, etc. Thus, in this period, the view 
of states as the main referent object has become less prevalent. 
 The final part of this chapter analyzes EU energy security definition based 
on the brief analysis of Security Studies. Accordingly, EU energy security 
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definitions focus on the threats that can affect the states and the environment.  This 
is quite different than the literature definitions, which mostly focus on the state 
security side. Thus, this chapter puts forward that EU energy security definition 
epitomizes the post-Cold War security approach, rather than a pure Cold War 
understanding of security. 
 
 
2.1 Energy Security: The Concept 
 
Energy security definitions are based on energy’s importance in so many 
facets of security, including military and economic ones. This section explores the 
energy security definitions in the literature and tries to underline the common points 
of these definitions, which will give the basic understanding of the energy security 
concept. 
Energy security definitions basically point out how the actor can be secure in 
energy issues. Thus, the definitions explicitly propose policies. For instance, Bahgat 
(2006: 965) defines energy security as the sustainable and reliable supplies at 
reasonable prices and he sees the diversification of both energy types and supply 
resources as the main route to energy security. This definition, then, argues that, by 
obtaining sustainable and reliable energy at reasonable prices, actors can achieve 
energy security. To state the matter differently, it finds the policies that would 
achieve sustainability and reliability of energy supplies at reasonable energy prices 
as the most appropriate ones. Thus the conditions that provide energy security also 
describe the political objectives that should be pursued. 
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as an 
adequate, affordable and reliable supply of energy (IEA, 2003). Most of the other 
definitions generally rely on this definition. Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005: 9) define 
energy security as follows: 
… in its most fundamental sense, energy security is assurance of the 
ability to access the energy resources required for the continued 
development of national power. In more specific terms, it is the 
provision of affordable, reliable, diverse and ample supplies of oil, gas 
and their future equivalents and adequate infrastructure to deliver those 
supplies to markets. 
 
Constantini et al also make a similar definition. According to them energy 
security is defined as the availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable 
price (Constantini et al., 2007: 210). For Barton et al., energy security is “a 
condition in which a nation or all, or most, of its citizens and business have access 
to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free 
from serious risk of major disruption of service” (Barton et. al, 2004: 3-13). Slightly 
different from these definitions, in 1993 IEA Ministers agreed on the elements of 
energy security as the diversity, efficiency and flexibility within the energy sector 
(IEA,1993). 
Based on these definitions, it can be assumed that there is a general tendency 
to equate energy security with supply security. There are many writers who discuss 
energy security as supply security. Yergin explains why this is the case: 
“diversification of supply is the starting point for energy security since widening the 
sources of supply lessens the impact of any particular disruption and provide 
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opportunities for compensating supplies” (Yergin, 2005: 57). Thus, energy security 
in the literature basically emphasizes supply security, which is the regular, 
sustainable, diverse supply of energy resources for the foreseeable future at 
affordable price. 
 
 
2.2 Energy Security: EU Discourse 
 
The aim of this section is to understand the energy security concept from EU 
perspective. Energy policy in the EU was mostly a national concern in the Cold 
War period, because “the strategic importance of the energy sector was so great that 
national governments didn’t want to share their sovereignty with a higher authority” 
(Matlary, 1997: 12-13). However, this understanding was challenged by internal 
and external developments in the post-Cold War era. Internally, the adoption of 
Single European Act in 1986 gave the Commission greater interdependence and a 
large role to European Parliament (EP) (Matlary, 1997: 20). Since then, the 
Commission started to take more action to break up national monopolies in energy 
by trying to establish an Internal Energy Market (IEM) and a Common European 
Energy Policy (CEP). Externally, with the dissolution of Soviet Union, the EU was 
forced to coordinate and formulate policy to deal with this region (Matlary, 1997: 
6). The Iraq crisis in 1990 also alarmed the EU into developing common policies 
against common threats. In other words, the changing internal and external 
environments in the post-Cold War period triggered greater efforts to formulate 
energy policy at the Union level. 
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Today, the energy security of the Union can best be understood by looking 
at the EU Commission’s papers, since the Commission is the lead institution in 
formulating energy policy. In 1995 a Green Paper on the CEP set out the main 
policies of energy as follows: furthering of the IEM, the development of security 
supply policy and integration of environmental criteria into energy policy (Matlary, 
1997:  63). On 29 November 2000, the EU published a new Green Paper under the 
name of “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply”. This 
Green Paper describes the present and future challenges in energy security and the 
appropriate policies to overcome them. Import dependency is identified as the most 
important threat in the energy security of the EU (Green Paper, 2000). The Green 
Paper also mentions the “new challenges” that the EU will have to face. One of 
them is the environmental concern that will affect resource consumption choices, 
since fossil fuel burning is threatening the environment. The other one is 
establishing the internal energy market, which hasn’t completely been achieved so 
far despite the Commission’s efforts. 
Based on these threats, The Green Paper of 2000 puts forward its energy 
security (or ‘strategy’ as called in the paper) as: 
… to ensure, for the well-being of its citizens and for the proper 
functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of 
energy products on the market at a affordable price for all consumers, 
whilst respecting environmental concerns and looking towards 
sustainable development. 
 
Four years later, the Commission (EC, Study on Energy Supply Security and 
Geopolitics, 2004) defined energy security as: 
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… the ability to ensure that future essential energy needs can be met, 
both by means of adequate domestic resources worked under 
economically acceptable conditions or maintained as strategic reserves, 
and by calling upon accessible and stable external sources supplemented 
where appropriate by strategic stocks. 
 
In 2006, the EU published another Green Paper on ‘European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’. Although there is not any direct 
definition of the energy security concept in this paper, the Commission defines an 
array of threats and political objectives related to the energy issue. Accordingly, 
higher prices, unstable energy supply and changes in Europe’s climate are listed as 
threats. At the same time, the basic pillars of Europe’s energy policy are seen as 
sustainability, competitiveness and secure energy. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
for the EU 2006 Green Paper, energy security can be described as having stable, 
regular and sustainable energy supplies at reasonable prices, while respecting 
environmental concerns.  
In conclusion, based on the Commission definitions, the basic tenets of EU 
energy security can be described as the integration of the market, security of supply, 
affordable prices and respecting environment. 
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2.3 Understanding EU Energy Security Definition 
 
  The energy security definitions of the literature and the EU show general 
similarities. Regular, sustainable, stable supplies at affordable prices are seen as the 
basic tenets of energy security. However, the EU, unlike most of the literature 
works, integrates environmental security and environmental threats into its own 
definition of energy security. This distinct characteristic is important to note since it 
gives an idea about EU energy security behavior. While the academic literature 
implicitly point out states as the main actors in energy policies, the EU realizes a 
broader type of energy security by integrating environmental security with it. To 
clarify the point, Security Studies will be analyzed briefly. 
 
 
2.3.1 Studying Security 
  
Security is usually defined as a “contested” or “ambiguous” concept in 
Security Studies (Helga Hafferdorn, 1991: 3; Baylis, 2005: 254). However, its being 
a contested concept does not come from the difficulty of making the definition; to 
the contrary, security is usually defined as “freedom from threats to core values” 
(Baylis, 2005: 254; Booth, 1991: 319). Yet, the difficulty of studying security for IR 
students stems mainly from the disagreement over the “referent object” of the 
security. Referent objects need to be analyzed because “security as a concept, 
clearly requires a referent object, for without an answer to the question ‘The 
security of what?’ the idea makes no sense” (Buzan, 1991: 26). For Buzan, Weaver 
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and De Wilde, referent objects are “things that are seen to be existentially 
threatened and that have legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde, 
1998: 36). They also point out that, ‘the referent object is that to which one can 
point and say, “It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to…”(Buzan, Weaver, de 
Wilde, 1998: 36).  In other words, referent object is a part of the units of security 
analysis.  
Studying the referent object is important because the answer that is given to 
“the security of what” changes the understanding of security. For example, for those 
who consider states as the referent objects of security, the threats that interest states- 
mainly military and economic- become important, and thus the relevant policies for 
this situation are shaped according to protect the state around the state security. On 
the other hand, if individuals are considered as the referent objects, then a wider 
array of political, economical, environmental and social threats enter into the 
agenda. Thus, the differences in the referent object of security determine the 
differences of security approach and the understanding of security. 
Relevant for security thinking, two main historical periods are the Cold War 
era and the post-Cold era, with each belonging to different philosophical traditions. 
Although each of these periods also show differences within themselves, it is 
appropriate to classify them in a dichotomous way for methodological and 
analytical convenience. 
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2.3.1.1 Cold War Security Studies 
 
The distinctiveness of the Cold War Security Studies comes from its 
overemphasis on nation-states as the primary referent objects of security. As there is 
no higher authority than states to regulate the relations between states, that is called 
anarchy by Cold War security scholars, security is the primary obligation of states 
(Baylis, 2005: 256). As the world is anarchic, “Security Studies assume that the 
conflict between states is always a possibility” (Walt, 1991: 212) and thus “states 
are preoccupied with survival, power and security” (Smith, 2000: 35). To achieve 
survival, states would inevitably develop offensive military capabilities to defend 
themselves, which will make each one dangerous to the other (Baylis, 2005: 256). 
Thus “Security Studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of 
military force” (Nye and Lynn-Jones as quoted in Walt, 1991: 212).  
The disproportionate focus on states as the main referents of security and the 
military as its dominant dimension started to be challenged during the Cold War. 
Bilgin (2004: 20-23) proposes three mainstream types of thinking as the main critics 
of Cold War security thinking throughout this period: Alternative security thinking, 
with its criticism of basic Cold-War security premises; peace research, with its 
focus on individuals, social groups and the emergent global society as the referents 
of security; and Third World Security thinking, which tries to include economic, 
political, and environmental issues to the security agenda. Yet, one of the most 
impacting critique of Cold War security thinking was established by Barry Buzan. 
In People, States and Fear (1991), Buzan argues for a broadened view of 
security, which will include not only military relationships, but also political, 
economic, societal, and environmental issues. In that sense, Buzan proposes the 
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broadening of Security Studies. As mentioned above, Buzan wasn’t the only or first 
writer to propose broadening the security agenda. Nevertheless, Buzan 
distinguished himself as a voice from within the discipline of security studies, as 
opposed to Peace Researchers or Third World experts (Bilgin, 2005: 26). 
Other than broadening the security agenda, Buzan’s work also proposed 
alternative referent objects of security. In his words: 
The search for a referent object of security goes hand-in-hand with that 
of necessary conditions. One soon discovers that security has many 
potential referent objects. Those objects of security multiply not only as 
the membership of the society of states increases, but also as one moves 
down through the state to the individual level, and up beyond it to the 
level of international system as a whole (Buzan, 1991: 26). 
 
While Buzan’s focus on states as the main referent for security was duly 
criticized by Critical Security thinkers, in Booth’s words, Buzan’s work “remains 
the most comprehensive theoretical analysis- in broadening security- of the concept 
in international relations literature” (Booth, 1991: 317). 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Post Cold-War Security Studies 
 
The common point of the post-Cold War Security Studies is their emphasis 
on referent-objects other than states. For post-Cold War Security Studies, although 
states are still referent-objects of security in the post-Cold War era, they are no 
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longer the main referent objects. Rather, in this era, individuals, ethnic groups and 
minorities, global society, women, etc., are regarded as the main referent objects of 
security according to different respective bodies of thought. 
There are a few reasons why states have no longer been treated as the main 
referent objects in the post-Cold War. For one thing, “Cold War Security Studies 
were the product of the Cold War” (Bilgin, 2005: 17). Accordingly: 
… the adoption of a state-centric approach to the study of security was 
done in the attempt to introduce some neatness and clarity to the 
complexity of studying international phenomena for the purposes of 
building ‘scientific’ discipline. This was not only because the complex 
task of dealing with human beings would not have produced the neat 
and tidy analysis a ‘science’ of Security Studies was thought to demand, 
but also because the perceived urgency of Cold War concerns made it 
difficult for its students to undertake the complex analyses of peoples 
required (Bilgin, 2005: 19). 
 
Therefore, with the end of the Cold War, scholars of Security Studies has started to 
focus more on “complex” analyses of the field. 
Second, security problems newly emerging in the early 1990’s have also 
helped scholars of Security Studies to concentrate more on non-state referent 
objects. Thus, the focus has shifted from states and military threats to newer 
problems and actors. Ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda shifted the 
focus to societal security and made ethnic groups and minorities the referent objects 
of security. Human rights abuses in various parts of the world, along with 
increasing poverty, migration and terrorism, have tilted the focus towards 
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individuals in Security Studies. Global warming and environmental degradation are 
also considered as new threats to global society, which has also become research 
field in the Security Studies. In short, in the post-Cold War period: 
The threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations 
across the world derive primarily not from a neighbor’s army but from 
other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, 
scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, 
terrorism, crime and disease (Booth, 1991: 318). 
Thus, the view of states as the main referent objects of the security along 
with overemphasis on military threats and capabilities has become less prevalent in 
the post-Cold War studies. 
Based on this brief analysis of Security Studies, it can be surmised that EU 
energy security represents a combination of Cold War and post-Cold War security 
understanding. It includes Cold War security understanding because in the energy 
security definition of the EU, though not explicitly mentioned, states are the referent 
object; in other words, they are the unit of security analysis for EU energy security. 
The reason is that states are centrally affected by the threats that energy poses- as 
from irregular, unstable supply and high prices. 
However, states are not the only referent objects in EU energy security 
definition and that is why EU energy security also includes post-Cold War security 
understanding as well. As the EU emphasizes environment and individuals as the 
part of its energy security, these actors have also become the referent objects of EU 
energy security.  
At first it might be difficult to understand how the environment can be a 
referent object. However, environment is surely considered as a referent object for 
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environmentalist groups. Accordingly, environment is a referent object because 
human and animal survival is contingent on environmental systems’ integrity 
(Buzan, Weaver, De Wilde, 1998: 38). Based on the above understanding, this 
study also takes environment as a referent object.   
 The focus on environment by the EU also means that individuals are 
indirectly the referent objects of EU energy security, since environmentally 
detrimental energy resources threaten human security. Most fossil resources 
produce greenhouse gases when burned and these gases affect the environment 
negatively and cause global warming (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 251). Global 
warming means severe air pollution and rising sea levels, a direct threat to half of 
the world’s population, which lives in coastal areas (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999: 
251). Moreover, global warming might also threaten the individuals’ security by 
changing climates and bringing droughts and degradation of fertile soils. 
Moreover, individuals are also directly defined as referent objects of EU 
energy security in the Green Paper of 2000. As is mentioned above, in 2000, EU 
defined its energy security as “…to ensure, for the well being of its citizens,…the 
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable 
prices for all consumers.…” (Green Paper, 2000).  
By taking the environment and indirectly individuals into consideration in its 
energy security definition, the EU is demonstrating that its conception of energy 
security reflects a broadened security approach. As has been shown above, in the 
post-Cold War era, Security Studies started to analyze a broad range of topics 
besides the military and economic threats towards states. They have also focused on 
referent objects other than states. Thus, by including environment and individuals, 
the EU manifests a broadened security understanding in its energy security 
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definition. Such an understanding will, of course, have implications for EU policies. 
What policies does the EU implement to realize the broadened security 
understanding, and for what reasons? Is it based on rational reasons or normative 
reasons? These questions will be answered in the next chapters and will give the 
insight into EU energy security behavior.            
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, a brief analysis of Security Studies and EU energy security 
discourse was analyzed. As a conclusion, it was shown that in its energy security 
definition, the EU has not limited itself to traditional security premises. It is true 
that member-states establish a part of EU energy security because EU energy 
security at present is based on the energy security of its member states. Since the 
EU does not have any institution that might be directly affected by energy 
problems, member-states are the most important actors in energy security. Yet, 
contrary to the literature, which mainly equates energy security to supply security, 
and thus takes states as the only referent objects of energy security, the EU 
integrates the environment and individuals into its energy security definition. 
Accordingly, the threats that are directed against environment and individuals are 
seen as the challenges of energy security. In that sense, in terms of 
conceptualizations, the EU implements a broader energy security understanding, 
since it takes into consideration referent objects other than states. Thus, EU energy 
security epitomizes the post-Cold War security approach, rather than a pure Cold 
War security understanding. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EU ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
 
 
 During the Cold War period, nation-states mainly had the leverage in the 
energy policy in the EU.  Yet, this started to change, and the Commission started to 
take more control in energy policies starting from the late 1980s. There were some 
internal and external reasons for this development. Internally, with the adoption of 
the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, a new movement appeared in completing 
internal market by regulating decision-making mechanism. “The introduction of 
qualified majority voting on the matters affecting the internal market meant that EC 
could now adopt measures that were subject to a certain degree of disagreement” 
(Matlary, 1997: 19). In other words, SEA transferred decision-making power to the 
institutions of the European Community (EC) and thus the EC has acquired much 
more leverage on energy policy. Being aware of the fact that the internal market 
would not be achieved without the energy market, the Commission added the 
energy field to the internal market discussions. 
 External conditions in the late 1980s also increased the importance of a 
common approach to energy. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the opening 
of Central and Eastern Europe brought the necessity of dealing with this region. “In 
the energy field, this meant that EU suddenly had to coordinate and formulate 
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policy to deal with this region and restructuring of its energy sector” (Matlary, 
1997: 6). Moreover, the increasing importance of environmental policy created the 
obligation of directing it along with the energy policy. The Gulf Crisis, at the same 
time, made EU decision-makers question the reliability of suppliers, and the 
security of supply in the long-term. 
 Based on these internal and external developments, EU energy policy started 
to be formulated based on three objectives: security of supply, competitiveness 
(opening of the markets), and sustainability (environmental considerations). This 
chapter analyzes the policies of the Union, or in other words, what does the EU do 
to achieve the objectives in energy? The main aim of this Chapter is to underline 
EU energy security policies, by which understanding EU energy security behavior 
will be possible.  
In the first section, EU energy situation will be described to better comment 
on the policies. EU consumption and import dependency will be the focus. In the 
second section, the internal policies will be analyzed, starting with the first 
conceptual energy paper of the Commission: the Green Paper of 2000. The Green 
Paper of 2006 will also be analyzed in details under the internal policy. In the third 
section, external policies of the Union will be the focus. Here, two important 
external policies of the Union, diversification and energy dialogues/partnerships 
will be analyzed. Under the diversification, EU efforts to diversify its natural gas 
routes will be the focus. In energy dialogues and partnerships section, EU relations 
with present and potential suppliers will be put forward. Namely, the EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership and the relations with 
Mediterranean countries in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), and 
INOGATE will be given priority. 
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3.1 EU Energy Situation 
 
The aim of this section is to present an analysis of EU energy situation1 in 
order to better understand the energy policies of the Union, which are going to be 
discussed in the next section. Empirical data and statistics of International Energy 
Agency (IEA), British Petroleum (BP), EU Energy Outlook, EU Green Paper, 
World Energy Outlook and US Energy Department will be relied on to accomplish 
the task. 
The most significant energy characteristic of the EU is that it is a resource-
poor region. It holds 0.6% of oil resources and 2% of natural gas resources, which 
are the two main fossil resources that are consumed in the world and in the Union 
(EIA, 2005). These limited reserves are concentrated in the North Sea, owned 
mainly by the Netherlands and United Kingdom (Bahgat, 2006: 963). Crude oil 
production is dominated by the UK (Research and Markets, 2007). The other 
countries with significant crude oil production are Romania, Italy, Germany and the 
Netherlands, and ten of the EU-25 member states have no oil production at all 
(Research and Markets, 2007). As for natural gas, the main producer is the UK, 
followed by the Netherlands. Only Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK produce 
more gas than they consume, and ten EU countries have no gas production at all 
(Research and Markets, 2007). What is more, after the North Sea’s crude oil 
production peaked in the 1990s, oil production has been declining in the Union. The 
decline is also foreseen for natural gas. Natural gas will fall in the EU from 225 
                                                
1
 What is meant by energy situation is the production and consumption levels, import dependency, 
resource and import allocation. 
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billion cubic meter (bcm) in 2010 to 147bcm in 2030 (Kjarstad and Johnson, 2007: 
873). 
Conversely, the EU is the second largest energy consumer in the world after 
the USA. With such scarcity of resources and second largest consumer, the result is 
that the EU is the largest energy importer in the world. At present, two-thirds of the 
consumed oil and gas and half of the consumed energy in the Union are imported 
(Kalyuzhnova, 2005: 60). Moreover, it is expected that the share of energy imports 
in total consumption will increase to 70% in the next twenty to thirty years (Green 
Paper, 2006).2 
The fossil fuels dominate the energy mix. According to 2005 statistics, oil 
constituted 37% of total consumption, natural gas 24%, solid fuels 18%, nuclear 
15% and renewables 6% (Annex to the Green Paper, as quoted in Bahgat, 2006: 
963). The domination of fossil resources is not expected to change in the medium 
term. By 2030 oil is projected to constitute 33.8% of total consumption, natural gas 
27%, solids 15%, renewables 12% and nuclear 11% (Annex to the Green Paper, as 
quoted in Bahgat, 2006: 967).3  
In 2002, the EU-15 imported its oil mainly from the Middle East4, Norway, 
Russia and Africa5. (EU Commission Services, as quoted in Kalyuzhnova, 2005: 
61). After enlargement, approximately 35% of oil imports to EU-25 came from the 
former USSR. As for gas, in 2005, EU imported 41% of its gas from Russian 
Federation, 25% from Norway and 15% from Algeria (BP, 2006). If the present 
                                                
2
 94% of oil, 84% of natural gas, 60% of solids expected to be imported in 2030. 
 
3
 The expectation of the share of the gas might differ in other projections. For instance the IEA 
predicts that by 2030 natural gas will establish 32% of the Union’s total consumption. 
 
4
 Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria are establishing the biggest share in EU oil imports. 
 
5
 Libya and Nigeria are the primary oil suppliers in Africa. 
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trends continue by 2030, 60% of EU gas imports are expected to come from Russia 
(Euractive, 2007). 
When the future projections of import dependency are analyzed, it will be 
seen that the dependency on natural gas rises to a great extent. It will increase to 
81% by 2030, from 49% of 2000. Import dependency on solids is also expected to 
increase widely; from 30% of 2000 to 65% by 2030. As oil consumption is 
expected to decrease, import dependency on oil will increase but not as much as gas 
or solids. It is expected that oil import dependency will rise to 90% by 2030, from 
75% of 2000 (EU Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2006). 
 
 
3.2 Internal Energy Policy of the EU 
 
 
3.2.1 The Green Paper of 2000 on “Towards a European Strategy 
for the Security of Energy Supply” 
 
The 2000 Green Paper on “Towards a European Strategy for the Security of 
Energy Supply” put forward a new European energy strategy. The Paper presents 
the weaknesses, future challenges and appropriate policies.  
The weaknesses of EU in energy stem from its highly unequal consumption 
and production levels, which result in external dependence. As stated above, the EU 
is the second largest energy consumer after the USA, and the largest energy 
importer in the world. As the Paper puts forward, in the biggest energy consumer 
 30
sectors, such as households, services and transport, the EU is dependent on oil and 
gas6 (The Green Paper, 2000: 14-15). Yet, the Community’s reserves are very 
limited in oil and gas. Moreover, because of the low quality of solid fuels and the 
high costs of their production, in absolute terms EU does not produce the desirable 
amounts of solids. Thus, as a result, in 1998, only half of the energy consumption is 
compensated by the EU production, and the rest is imported. The Green Paper alerts 
that the picture will become more worrying considering the fact that EU’s physical 
energy stocks are bound to decrease (The Green Paper, 2000: 21). Therefore, 
external dependence will increase if the present trends continue. The Green Paper 
foresees 90% dependence for oil, 70% for gas and 100% dependence for coal in the 
next 20-30 years (The Green Paper, 2000: 21). Moreover, the dependence is not 
only limited to supply but also to the transit. Russian gas, which composes 40% of 
gas imports of the EU, for instance, needs to be transported by third parties, Ukraine 
being the main one.7  What is more, if Caspian gas is to be imported, the EU will 
also become dependent on Turkey and South East European states for transport.  
Another weakness of the EU is its inability to be influential over 
international prices. According to the Green Paper, developing countries’ energy 
choices will affect the international energy markets the most (The Green Paper, 
2000: 27). Furthermore, the EU is not capable of changing geopolitical events such 
as the Middle East peace process and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries’ (OPEC) decisions. For the Green Paper, the basic reason of the EU’s 
inability of influencing the international market is the lack of Common European 
                                                
6
 63% of household needs are supplied by oil and gas and 98% of transport consumption is 
established by oil. 
 
7
 80% of Russian gas to theEU is transferred by Ukraine. 
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Energy Policy, which reduces the EU’s bargaining power (The Green Paper, 2000: 
28). 
Having mentioned the problems of the EU on energy, the Green Paper 
evaluates the positive and negative sides of each energy resource for EU 
consumption. The Paper defines nuclear energy and coal as “undesirables” because 
of the negative European perceptions about these resources (The Green Paper, 
2000: 30). As for nuclear, although it has a strong potential to reduce carbon 
emissions, the Member states do not desire to invest on it for several reasons. 
Firstly, “the potential health and environment hazards from nuclear fission mean 
that public opinion is to some degree opposed to it” (The Green Paper, 2000: 32). 
Moreover, the Paper asserts that: 
The arrival of pressure groups and ecological parties onto the political 
stage of the Member states and Chernobyl accident marked a turning 
point in the development of nuclear industry ...five out of eight member 
states with nuclear power have now adopted or announced a moratorium 
...Italy renounced nuclear energy following a referendum in 1987, 
Germany has announced its decision to shut down its last reactors in 
2021, and Belgium will do the same in 2025 (The Green Paper, 2000: 
32). 
 
Second, the storage of nuclear waste is posited as another problem in the 
Green Paper. Nuclear energy, according to the Paper, can be developed when “the 
waste issue finds a satisfactory solution with maximum transparency” (The Green 
Paper, 2000: 33). 
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Other factors that can affect the future of nuclear energy are “the economic 
viability of the new generation of power stations, the safety of reactors in Eastern 
Europe and the fight against nuclear proliferation in the CIS” (The Green Paper, 
2000: 32). 
Coal, once the dominant resource in the Union also has several problems in 
its production and consumption phases. First of all, the cost of imported coal is 
cheaper than domestic coal, which resulted in the decline of production in the 
Community. Second, “coal generates pollution at every stage of production and 
utilization cycle” (The Green Paper, 2000: 34). This is an important problem for EU 
since it has commitments to reduce pollution.  
However, coal also has important advantages. Firstly, “being sold on a 
competitive international market, the price of coal shows unequal stability 
compared with other energy products” (The Green Paper, 2000: 34). Second, “the 
flexibility of coal contracts and the development of a spot market have allowed the 
price of coal to adjust constantly to the market situation” (The Green Paper, 2000: 
34). Based on those facts, the Green paper links coal’s future “to the development 
of techniques which make it easier to use and lessening the environmental impact in 
terms of pollutant emissions through clean combustion technologies and CO2 
sequestration” (The Green Paper, 2000: 36). 
The picture in oil, on the other hand, is different than nuclear energy and 
coal, because of its ease of use and the established practices. The Green Paper 
foresees that with the ongoing trends, oil dependence will reach 90% by 2020, 50% 
of which will be imported from the OPEC. To prevent the risks attached to oil 
dependence, the Green paper puts forward the diversification of resource types. 
This is where natural gas and renewables become important. 
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Natural gas and renewable energy resources are presented as “seductive 
alternatives”. Natural gas has gained a considerable place in the energy 
consumption of the EU lately due to its ease of use in different sectors such as 
power, heating and transport; and due to its low carbon emission levels. However, 
natural gas also has some disadvantages. Accordingly: 
…the combination of price indexing, supplies under long-term take or 
pay contracts and imports into Europe primarily through gas pipelines 
makes the gas market into a regional market, characterized by reduced 
competition between exporters...with regard to Russia, a certain increase 
in dependence on that country seems inevitable (The Green Paper, 
2000: 40). 
Thus, the Green Paper resumes the gas dependence as follows: 
In the long run, the supply of gas in Europe risks creating a new 
situation of dependence, all the more so given the less intensive 
consumption of carbon. Greater consumption of gas could be followed 
by an upward trend in prices and undermine the European Union’s 
security of supply (The Green Paper, 2000: 41). 
To overcome this problem, the Green Paper proposes geographical 
diversification of the gas supplies, which can be realized by pipeline transfer from 
the Caspian and the Middle East region and by liquefied natural gas (LNG) from 
overseas. 
Renewable energy resources are labeled “political priorities” because of 
their potential to increase the security of supply by diversification, by contributing 
to indigenous production, and by their zero or low carbon emission levels. The 
types of renewables that can be used efficiently in the EU are hydroelectricity, 
 34
biomass, wind energy, solar power, and geothermal. The Green Paper also focuses 
on bio-fuels for their potential to substitute oil in transportation. The bio-fuels have 
advantages in two senses: first, they emit between 40-80% less greenhouse gases 
than other fuels (The Green Paper, 2000: 43). Second, they reduce dependency on 
oil thus increasing energy security. Although the share of bio-fuels is really small - 
0.15% of the total consumption of mineral oils in 1998 (The Green Paper, 2000: 
42)- they are seen as an important alternative to oil in transportation by the Green 
Paper. 
However, the Green Paper also mentions the obstacles to the development of 
renewables. First of all, the economic and social system is based on centralized 
development around conventional sources of energy, such as coal, oil and natural 
gas. Second, renewables require significant investment. Finally, “subsidiary, 
national, regional and local regulations need to be adopted for land planning and use 
to give clear priority to the installation of generation plants for electricity from 
renewable energy sources” (The Green Paper, 2000: 44). Unless these obstacles are 
overcome, the target set up by the Commission in 1998, such as to double the 
production level from renewables by 2010, cannot be met. 
In short, the weakness of EU energy situation stems from low level of 
production capacity, high levels of consumption and external dependence. Based on 
current trends, mentioned above, the EU is expected to increase its dependence on 
oil and gas. The development of indigenous production in coal and nuclear does not 
seem probable because of environmental commitments of the EU and public 
opposition against nuclear. Renewables, on the other hand, seems to have lots of 
obstacles to develop in the near future. All of these factors establish the weaknesses 
of EU energy situation. 
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The second part of the Green Paper presents the challenges that the EU 
should overcome due to its energy supply. The first one is the climate change and 
the second is the integrated European energy market. 
For the Green Paper, climate change is a global security problem, which can 
affect economic activities and land use of mankind deeply (The Green Paper, 2000: 
48). The reason for climate change is attributed to the energy sector in the Green 
Paper because fossil resources are producing CO2, which is responsible for the 
greenhouse effect (The Green Paper, 2000: 47). For example, in the EU, oil 
accounts for 50% of CO2 emission, coal for 28% and natural gas for 22% (The 
Green Paper, 2000: 47). 
Being a member of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has strong commitments in 
dealing with the issue. EU commitment is to reduce its greenhouse gas emission by 
8% in 2012, compared to the 1990 level (The Green Paper, 2000: 47).  Yet, this 
target seems ambitious, considering the fact that, “total emissions of greenhouse 
gases by the Union of 15 Member States are expected to increase at least 5,2% 
between 1990-2010, if no action is taken” (The Green Paper, 2000: 48). Thus, there 
is a need for new policies, the most important of which are reducing the 
consumption and increasing the share of less carbon-intensive energy products, 
particularly in road transport and buildings (The Green Paper, 2000: 49). Reducing 
consumption can be achieved by a more efficient taxation system. By more 
efficient, the Paper means a “harmonization of tax rates between Member States” 
whereby it will be possible to restructure national taxation systems and achieve 
reduction objectives in environment and transport (The Green Paper, 2000: 55). 
Increasing the share of less carbon intensive technologies by state aids is also 
considered an effective policy measure to reduce the consumption and CO2 levels. 
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For the Green Paper, some energy sectors like oil, gas and nuclear power should not 
benefit from state subsidies, while renewables should. An effective demand 
management, at the same time, is considered as an influential policy to tackle 
climate change problem. Decrease in energy demand by informing individuals and 
by using more energy efficient products will not only decrease dependence on fossil 
fuels, but will also decrease the CO2 level that is produced by these fossil resources.  
In short, in regard to climate change, the Commission proposes two main 
policies: reducing the consumption by which fossil resources’ usage will decrease 
and using less carbon-intensive resources such as renewables. The latter can be 
provided by efficient Community wide legislations as taxation and state aids. 
The IEM is as another challenge that should be overcome in EU energy 
policy. The Community, though having no competence in this area, has succeeded 
to adopt some measures in the integration of an international market, such as 
achieving price transparency, the transit of electricity and gas through grids (The 
Green Paper, 2000: 58). Yet, there are still important obstacles to be overcome to 
achieve a fully working internal market. Low level of intra-Community trade in 
electricity and insufficient transmission systems are slowing down the integration of 
national markets (The Green Paper, 2000: 59). To tackle these problems, the Green 
Paper states that “a European mechanism for collaboration between internal parties 
with a view of defining a European plan for the major missing internal 
infrastructure could resolve these problems” (The Green Paper, 2000: 60). 
More concretely, the Paper proposes two new components. First, “all the 
national regulations should sit on an advisory body to assist the Commission with 
the smooth operation of the internal market” (The Green Paper, 2000: 61), and 
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second is the creation of a new interconnection infrastructure (The Green Paper, 
2000: 61). 
The third chapter of the Green Paper is the main part where energy strategy 
is outlined. Before drawing the policies, the Paper presents the energy situation 
more concretely. Accordingly, oil and gas reliance is inescapable as well as the 
increasing import dependency (The Green Paper, 2000: 67). Moreover, with the 
ongoing trends, renewables will short of the desired targets which will result in the 
failure to decrease CO2 emissions and to meet Kyoto objectives (The Green Paper, 
2000: 67). 
Having presented these problems, the Green Paper proposes controlling the 
growth of demand and managing supply dependence as the most appropriate 
policies in EU energy strategy. 
Controlling of the growth of demand is crucial to reduce the massive 
dependence on foreign energy supplies and to realize the commitments of the Kyoto 
Protocol (The Green Paper, 2000: 69). The most effective instruments for 
controlling demand are taxation, legislation, energy saving schemes, and 
development of new technologies. While taxation and new legislations will control 
the demand, through the development of new technologies energy saving will be 
possible. Thus, controlling demand, and decreasing consumption will be possible. 
The Green Paper also proposes sectoral policies to control the demand. In transport, 
the imbalance between road transport and rail transport is addressed, and the 
problematic sides of road transport, such as being a large oil consumer and emitting 
high levels of CO2, are mentioned. The concrete policies that the Green Paper 
proposes here are the revitalization of railways, development of short sea shipping 
and usage of inland waterways, reorganization of road transport sector, developing 
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a trans-European rail freight network, promoting urban transportation, using 
hydrogen fueled vehicles, and finally developing of ‘polluter pays’ system (The 
Green Paper, 2000: 70). In buildings too, the Green Paper proposes energy saving 
rules such as “the introduction of standard energy certificates that would make the 
energy variable factor on the property market and will create demand for energy-
efficient buildings” (The Green Paper, 2000: 71), and encouraging the use of 
renewable energy resources in new buildings (The Green Paper, 2000: 72). Thus, 
the controlling of the growth of demand will serve two main objectives of EU 
energy policy: increase the energy security by reducing the dependence and 
realizing environmental commitments by reducing the consumption of fossil fuels. 
Another policy to increase the energy security of the EU is the responsible 
policy for managing supply dependence. Since the development of less pollutant 
energy sources, as renewables and nuclear, are also increasing the indigenous 
production, reliance on these resources will decrease the supply dependence. 
Moreover consistent stock policy in oil and natural gas will also reduce the risks 
related on supply dependence.  
 As for ensuring external supplies, ongoing dialogues with producers are 
essential (The Green Paper, 2000: 73).  Moreover, to have a supply network with 
security guarantees also increases security of supply. Here, the construction of new 
oil and gas pipelines, by which Caspian and Middle East resources will be 
transferred, is essential. Also, “for imports of electricity, there should be better 
interconnections between the networks of Member States of those of the Union with 
the applicant countries, and Russia.” (The Green Paper, 2000: 74) These policies of 
EU will be analyzed in more details later, under the External Policy of EU section. 
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3.2.2 The Green Paper of 2006 on “A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” 
 
 In 2006 the Commission published a new Green Paper under the name of ‘A 
European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’. As mentioned 
in its introduction, this Green Paper puts forward suggestions and options that could 
form the basis for a new comprehensive European energy policy. (The Green Paper, 
2006: 4) This energy policy should have three main objectives: Sustainability 
(sustainable development), competitiveness and security of supply. From that 
perspective, this Green Paper is similar to its precedent Green Paper of 2000, in the 
sense that both try to achieve security of supply by respecting environment and 
increasing competition by integrating energy markets. Yet, the Green Paper of 2006 
proposes more concrete policies, especially in internal market, than the Green Paper 
of 2000. Also, the Green Paper of 2006 focuses more on the technical side of 
energy issue. 
 To achieve sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply, the Green 
Paper specifies six priority areas that include concrete policy proposals. The first 
priority is the completion of the internal electricity and gas markets. The Green 
Paper believes that the sustainability, competitiveness and secure energy cannot be 
achieved unless open and competitive market exists. “A truly competitive, single 
European electricity and gas market would bring down the prices, improve security 
of supply and boost competitiveness” (The Green Paper, 2006: 5). Although the 
Commission achieved some degree of success in opening of the market, as EU 
consumers’ right to purchase electricity and gas from any supplier in the EU, there 
is still a lot to do. As mentioned in the Green Paper, many markets in Europe are 
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still largely national and dominated by a few companies (The Green Paper, 2006: 
5); and there are also many differences between member states approaches 
regarding the market opening (The Green Paper, 2006: 5). Besides these national 
differences, there are also structural problems in achieving a fully integrated 
market. Actions are needed in the development of a single European grid, 
improving interconnections, investing in generation capacity, creating more 
effective unbundling and boosting the competitiveness of European industry (The 
Green Paper, 2006: 6-7).  
 The second priority area is the establishment of the IEM that guarantees the 
security of supply and solidarity between member states. Enhancing security of 
supply in the internal market might be achieved by the European energy supply 
observatory which will monitor the demand and supply patterns and “which will 
identify the possible shortfalls in infrastructure and supply at an early stage” (The 
Green Paper, 2006: 8); improved network security, which will require the increased 
coordination and exchange of infrastructure between transmission systems; a 
mechanism that will prepare and ensure rapid solidarity, and common standards to 
protect infrastructure (The Green Paper, 2006: 8). A review of EU’s approach to oil 
and gas stocks is essential. “This would be helped by a new Commission legislative 
proposal ensuring the publication on a more regular and transparent basis the state 
of Community oil stocks” (The Green Paper, 2006: 8). 
 The third priority area is to diversify the energy mix by which sustainability 
will also be achieved. By Using clean coal technology and nuclear power (as long 
as the nuclear waste and safety problems are addressed), the EU will achieve 
sustainability. Indigenous production by coal and nuclear will also decrease EU 
dependence on foreign supplies.  
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 The fourth priority is the necessity of an integrated approach to tackle 
climate change. Increasing energy efficiency and thus reducing the consumption of 
fossil fuels, using more renewable energy resources in electricity and in transport 
are the main policies to handle climate change problems (The Green Paper, 2006: 
10-13). To achieve the former, that is, increasing energy efficiency, the Green Paper 
proposes long term targeted energy efficiency campaigns, increasing efficiency in 
buildings, improving efforts in energy efficiency in transport sector and improving 
urban public transport, and “harnessing financial instruments to stimulate 
investments in energy efficiency projects” (The Green Paper, 2006: 11). For the 
latter, the paper proposes a renewed effort to meet existing renewable targets (12% 
by 2010), consideration of new targets and objectives beyond 2010, “a new 
directive on heating and cooling” (The Green Paper, 2006: 12), a detailed plan to 
stabilize and reduce the EU’s dependence on imported oil, and initiatives to bring 
clean and renewable energy sources closer to markets (The Green Paper, 2006: 19).  
 The fifth priority area is the creation of a strategic European energy 
technology plan. The development of new technologies will help the EU achieve 
sustainability and security of supply more easily by contributing to energy 
efficiency and low carbon technologies. To succeed in doing this, the Green Paper 
offers a strategic energy technology plan, which “should accelerate the development 
of promising energy technology” (The Green Paper, 2006: 13), and “making best 
use of Europe’s resources” (The Green Paper, 2006: 19). 
 The sixth priority is the creation of common external energy policy.  This is 
going to be analyzed in the next section in more details. 
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3.3. External Energy Policy of the EU 
 
This section will analyze the external energy policy of the EU. Although the 
EU does not have a CEP yet, there are strong efforts and initiatives of EU 
institutions, mainly the Commission, to establish the Community wide external 
energy policy. For this reason, in various papers, the external challenges, risks, 
objectives and policies are presented. The aim of this section is to analyze this 
external policy of the Union. What are the external challenges to EU energy 
security, in which ways they can be tackled, what relations has the EU established 
with third parties, and for what reasons are the questions that will be answered. The 
first part of the section will put forward the challenges and objectives of EU 
external energy policy and will show how the EU designs its external energy policy. 
The second part will analyze EU relations with third parties in energy, particularly 
with producer regions. Overall, the analysis of the external energy policy of the EU 
will help to understand the energy security behavior of the Union. 
 
 
3.3.1 The Objectives of EU External Energy Policy 
 
EU external energy policy is designed to respond to the energy challenges 
and problems that arise from outside conditions. The main external challenge to 
EU’s energy security stems from its over dependence on foreign supplies. As 
presented in the first chapter, EU energy security is defined as achieving reliable, 
affordable and sustainable flows of energy. To achieve all of these targets, the EU is 
dependent on foreign supplies. As the EU cannot produce the sufficient amount of 
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energy to meet its consumption, EU is dependent on external supplies and outside 
conditions such as increasing global energy demand and rising oil and gas prices- to 
be able to get reliable, affordable and sustainable input of resources. Moreover, 
climate change, one of the objectives of EU energy security, being a global 
problem, requires global action. Therefore, in this topic too, the EU is dependent on 
other actors’ policies. In short, EU energy security is and can be affected greatly by 
outside conditions. This is why external energy policy is very important for EU 
energy security. This is also reflected in various papers of the EU. In the Green 
Paper of 2006, the reason for the creation of a common external policy is to react to 
“the challenges of high and volatile energy prices, increasing import dependency, 
strongly growing global energy demand and global warming”(The Green Paper, 
2006: 19-20). Another Commission paper mentions, “the development of a coherent 
and focused external EU energy policy, drawing on the full range of EU internal 
and external policies, would enhance the collective external energy security of the 
Union” (An External Policy to Serve Europe’s Interests: Paper From Commission 
/SG/HR for the European Council, 2006). 
How should such strategically important policy be designed, and what 
should be its objectives are the next questions. The first step should be “to agree at 
Community level on the aims of an External Energy Policy and on the actions 
needed at both Community and national level to achieve it” (The Green Paper, 
2006).  A Community-wide policy would allow the EU to speak with one voice, 
which will result in the strengthening of leverages. In other words, a single 
European external policy rather than Member States’ policies will increase the 
political and economic influence of the Community in external supply conditions. 
This External Energy Policy, in general sense, must be: 
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…coherent (backed up by all Union policies, the Member States and 
industry), strategic (fully recognizing the geo-political dimensions of 
energy-related security issues) and focused (geared towards initiatives 
where Union level action can have a clear impact in furthering its 
interests. It must also be consistent with the EU’ broader foreign policy 
objectives such as conflict-prevention and resolution, non-proliferation 
and promoting human rights (An External Policy to Serve Europe’s 
Interests: Paper From Commission /SG/HR for the European Council, 
2006). 
 
Based on this general definition, the EU proposes particular policies in 
external energy policy. For the Green Paper there should be several subtopics of this 
policy. First of all, a clear policy on security and diversifying energy supplies is 
necessary. Such policy would provide “clearly identified priorities for the upgrading 
and construction of new infrastructure necessary for the security of EU energy 
supplies, notably new gas and oil supplies and energy terminals as well as the 
application of transit and third party access to existing pipelines” (The Green Paper, 
2006: 15). The Green Paper identifies the Caspian region, North Africa and the 
Middle East as alternative oil and gas suppliers. Second, energy partnership with 
producers, transit countries and other international actors is an important step for a 
coherent external policy. This is twofold: dialogue with major energy producers 
which would offer security for both the EU and producers, and developing a pan 
European energy community that would increase security of supply for EU and its 
neighbors by “developing common trade, transit and environmental rules, market 
harmonization and integration” (The Green Paper, 2006: 16). Third, reacting 
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effectively to external crisis situations can promote EU interests in its energy 
policy. Here the Green Paper offers a new Community mechanism to “enable rapid 
coordinated reaction to emergency external energy supply situations impacting EU 
supplies” (The Green Paper, 2006: 20).  Fourth, the Paper proposes integrating 
energy into other policies with an external dimension. This means integrating 
energy policy into climate change and energy efficient renewable resources with 
other major energy consuming countries like US and Japan. The EU sees any 
cooperation in those fields as beneficial for Europe’s energy security.  In short, 
diversification and energy partnerships/dialogues with other actors can be 
considered as the main proposed external energy policies in the 2006 Green Paper. 
The next part analyzes these policies in more details. 
 
 
3.3.1.1 Diversification 
 
Diversification of the resource base is crucial for energy security since it 
reduces the risks and the problems linked to the supply. As long as the suppliers are 
diversified, the risks that might arise from one exporter are minimized. This 
maximizes reliability, sustainability and affordability, which are the main factors of 
energy security. 
It might be assumed that EU has not been successful in diversifying its 
energy base and the energy routes so far. At present, 80% of EU’s gas supply comes 
from three countries: Russia has the biggest share with 41% (BP, 2006). In oil, on 
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the other hand, the picture is slightly better with 35% import dependency on the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU) and slightly less on the Middle East.  
EU decision makers once more realized the importance of diversification for 
the energy security and the problem of being over reliant on a few suppliers and on 
a few transit routes after the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over natural gas prices in 
January 2006. 8 Since then, the alternative suppliers and diversification routes have 
started to be discussed in the EU more frequently and deeply. This section analyzes 
the initiatives of the EU in diversifying its energy routes. However, it should be 
mentioned that the focus here will be more on natural gas pipelines than oil 
pipelines because natural gas has more potential of creating dependence between 
the parties, since it cannot be transferred as easily as oil or coal. While oil and coal 
can cheaply be transferred by seaway and this makes diversification easier, there are 
only two ways of transporting gas: by pipeline or LNG. Because of the latter being 
expensive and generally preferred in long distance overseas, pipeline is the most 
common way to transfer gas. The restricted options in transferring gas generally and 
particularly in the EU’s case because Russia’s geographical proximity to Europe as 
well as its historical ties with the region’s countries and the existing pipeline system 
with Europe are the factors that make the diversification of gas more difficult for 
the EU. For these reasons, future transfer of gas seems to be crucial for EU energy 
security and this is why the focus will be on alternative gas routes. 
 
 
 
                                                
8
 “Although there was no slow down in the stream of Russian exports to Europe, the dispute raised 
doubts about Russia’s reliability as a source of energy to Europe” (Baghat, 2006, p.962). 
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3.3.1.1.1 Alternative Natural Gas Routes 
 
Alternative natural gas routes are designed mainly to reduce the dependence 
on Russia in gas supplies and on Ukraine in gas transit. This is why Caspian Basin 
and the Middle East are seen as the most viable options for diversifying gas sources. 
The planned projects are as follows: 
 
 
a. The Nabucco Project 
 
The Nabucco Project aims to diversify both the supplier and the transit 
country in natural gas by exporting the Caspian and the Middle Eastern gas to 
Europe through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The pipeline will 
be 3300 km long and will have a capacity of 25-30bcm/y. The transit countries are 
expected to take 8-10bcm/y, making final delivery in Austria around 17-22bcm/y 
(Robert, 2004: 9).  
In 2004, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH is established with 
the objective of coordinating the project. The shareholders of the company are 
Botaş, Bulgargaz, Transgaz, Mol and OMV. Total, Gaz de France, E.On and RWE 
have also applied to join the project, which can help to resolve the financial 
problems because of the latter companies’ high credit ratings.  
The technical issues of the project are expected to be resolved by the end of 
2007, and the construction is due to start in 2008, for completion by 2011 
(Petroleum Economist, 2007).  
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b. The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) 
 
The SCP is another pipeline, which will transfer Central Asia’s gas to 
Europe via Turkey. The pipeline will transfer Azeri gas first to Tbilisi and then to 
Erzurum in Turkey. SCP will supply 8.6bcm/y in the first phase, but it is expected 
to export 20bcm/y capacity when BP, the technical operator of the pipeline, will 
develop Shah Deniz Caspian gas fields (Petroleum Economist, 2007).  
The significance of the pipeline might increase in the future if two other 
projects are also realized. The first one is the Nabucco Project that is mentioned 
above. The SCP could feed Nabucco and thus enhance its capacity. The second is 
the Trans Caspian Pipeline (TCP), which aims to transfer Kazakh and Turkmen gas 
to Azerbaijan. Although the TCP is just an idea right now and there are many 
potential problems about its development, if it is realized it could be linked to SCP 
and then to Nabucco. The TCP-SCP-Nabucco would make each project very 
significant for EU energy security due to their ability to reduce EU dependence on 
Russia in gas supplies and on Ukraine in gas transit.  
 
 
c. The North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP-Nord Stream) 
 
The NEGP project aims to transport Russian gas from the “Russian coast 
north of St. Petersburg (Vyborg) under the Baltic Sea to Northern Germany and 
then onward via the Netherlands to the UK” (Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament on the development of energy policy 
for the enlarged EU, its neighbors and Partner Countries, 2003). Sweden, Denmark, 
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Belgium and France could also be potential users of this gas. This is a joint project 
of three major companies: Gazprom of Russia, Wintershall of Holland and E.ON 
Ruhrgas of Germany and the project is scheduled to begin operation in 2010. In the 
first phase, there will only be one pipeline with the transport capacity of 27,5bcm/y. 
In the second phase, a parallel pipeline, which is planned to be built in 2012, will 
come on stream and will double the capacity (www.nord-stream.com/eng/project, 
last accessed on 12 July 2007). 
The construction of the pipeline would not help the EU’s objective of 
diversifying suppliers. Yet, the pipeline will still enhance EU energy security by 
making it less dependent on Ukraine in gas transit because the pipeline will transfer 
Russian gas directly to Europe. 
 
 
d. The Medgaz and Galsi Pipelines 
 
Another strategy of the EU to decrease its dependence on Russia is to rely 
on its other exporter Algeria. For this reason, two other projects under consideration 
are: Medgaz and Galsi Pipelines. 
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1. Medgaz Pipeline 
 
 
Medgaz Pipeline aims to transfer Algerian gas first to Spain and then to 
European markets. The pipeline will first transfer Algerian gas from Hassi R’mel 
gas field to Mediterranean coast of Beri Saf. From there, the gas will be transferred 
by offshore pipeline to the Spain coast of Almeria. The pipeline is expected to 
become operational in 2009 and when complete, the pipeline will transfer 8bcm/y 
(Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the development of energy policy for the enlarged EU, its neighbors and Partner 
Countries, 2003). 
 
 
2. Galsi Pipeline  
 
Another planned pipeline is Galsi, which aims to transfer Algerian gas, from 
Hassi R’mel field to first Sardinia and then to the west of Italy. The Galsi pipeline is 
expected to be operable at the end of 2009 and will transfer 8bcm/y like Medgaz. 
(Petroleum Economist, 2003) 
These two pipelines- Medgaz and Galsi- could also establish the first phase 
of larger projects as transferring the gas of other states in Africa. Nigeria, for 
example, is one of the most important potential suppliers with its large gas 
resources. EU has already made efforts to transfer Nigerian gas to Europe by using 
existing and future pipeline infrastructure between Algeria and Spain. With the 
Nigal pipeline, also referred as Trans-African/Trans-Saharan, gas from Nigeria’s 
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Warri region will be transferred to the Mediterranean coast of Algeria, and then 
from there, it will be supplied to Europe. The pipeline is expected to become 
operational in 2015 with the transfer capacity of 30 bcm of gas per year. 
(http://www.answers.com/topic/nigal-pipeline, last accessed on 14 July).  
 
 
e. Turkey – Greece – Italy Interconnector 
 
Interconnector means a two-way pipeline system. So, when this project is 
completed, it will be able to transfer gas from East to West and vice versa. Thus, the 
project will increase ‘the flexibility of the supply’ (Roberts, 2005: 10). 
The first phase of the project is to build an interconnector between Turkey 
and Greece. Approximately 300 km long, the interconnector will work from 
Karacabey of Turkey to Komotimi of Greece. When completed, it is expected to 
transfer 3bcm/y to Greece. 
The second phase of the interconnector will be between Greek terminal of 
Stavrilimenas and Italian part of Otranto (Roberts, 2005: 10). This second line is 
expected to be operational in 2011, with the capacity of transferring 8bcm/y. 
This interconnector is designed to link to STC, whereby it will be able to 
transfer Caspian gas to Europe. As EU energy commissioner Andris Piebalgs puts 
forward in his speech “this infrastructure will contribute to the European efforts to 
diversify both the geographical origin of European energy and the supply routes” 
(http://www.neurope.eu/view_news.php?id=70054, last accessed on 14 July 2007). 
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3.3.1.2 Energy Dialogues and Partnerships 
 
3.3.1.2.1 The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 
 
The creation of EU-Russia energy dialogue stems from one basic fact: 
mutual interdependence. As it was shown above, Russia is the main energy supplier 
of the EU; it is the largest gas and the largest oil exporter. It is also the largest 
uranium supplier to the EU and provides a considerable proportion of the uranium 
enrichment requirements (Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on the development of energy policy for the enlarged EU, 
its neighbors and Partner Countries, 2003). This mutual interdependence creates the 
condition of EU willingness to secure adequate energy supplies and Russian 
willingness to secure foreign investments in energy production. The dialogue is thus 
based on the basic assumption that “interdependence between the two regions will 
grow – from the EU for reasons of security of supply; on the part of Russia, to 
secure foreign investments and facilitate its own access to EU and world markets” 
(Euractive, 2007). More simply, the reason of the dialogue can be described as 
“Europe’s investments in return for Russia’s oil and gas” (Bahgat, 2005: 23). 
Under this mutual interdependence, both sides agreed at the October 2000 
EU-Russia summit to institute an energy dialogue on a regular basis. The purpose of 
this dialogue is noted as:  
…to raise all issues of common interest related to the energy sector, 
including the introduction of cooperation on energy saving, 
rationalization of production and transportation infrastructures, 
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European investment possibilities, and relations between produces and 
consumer countries (http://ue.eu.int/newsroom, last accessed on 19 July 
2007). 
 
In the Synthesis Report of 2001, the common concerns of the parties, the 
mutual interests and the common short and long term interests were identified. 
Accordingly, the parties “share the same concerns ensuring stable energy markets, 
reliable and growing imports and exports, modernized Russian energy sector, 
improve energy efficiency and reduce green-house gas emissions”(Synthesis 
Report, 2001). Based on these concerns, the Synthesis Report designs five major 
themes of mutual interest: ensuring the security of energy supplies, the development 
of the Russian economy and energy resources, the application of pan European 
market, the challenge of climate change, the conditions framing the use of nuclear 
energy (Synthesis Report, 2001). Based on these mutual interests and common 
concerns, the Synthesis Report proposes an agreed set of mutual commitments, 
which is expected to become legally binding for both parties. In that sense, issues 
leading to rapid results and longer-term initiatives are proposed. For the former one, 
the situation of long term take-or-pay contracts, new strategic transport 
infrastructure of common interest (new energy routes), improvement of the energy 
production and legal framework for the large-scale investments, security of the 
transport networks (creation of regional satellite monitoring system which will 
control the transport system) and energy efficiency are set as the short term targets. 
Long term initiatives, on the other hand, consist of the political investment support 
scheme, cooperation in the field of climate change, in which the ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by all parties has utmost importance, technology cooperation and 
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building a technology center, trading electricity, energy efficiency and the use of 
renewables. These short and long-term policies have established the base of EU – 
Russia Energy Dialogue and as the progress reports since 2001 have shown, the 
dialogue tries to achieve these objectives. 
So far, the dialogue has achieved significant results in some areas. First of 
all, EU – Russia Energy Technology Center was built in 2002, with the objective of 
strengthening cooperation in energy technologies in the sectors of oil, gas, coal, 
electricity and renewables, attracting investments and to contribute energy 
efficiency (http://www.technologycentre.org/content.php?topic=4, last accessed on 
19 July 2007). The Center’s work program consists of information exchange, 
coordination of activities to facilitate contacts between EU and Russian energy 
sector actors, identifying and assisting the promotion of large scale technology 
cooperation projects, cooperation with other Russian, the EU and Member States’ 
energy centers, and the creation of a common information space for the 
dissemination of energy technology (Piper, 2004: 19).  
The center has so far organized considerable amounts of round tables, 
seminar workshops and congresses, all of which focused on energy efficiency, use 
of renewables, technology transfer, investment projects and clean coal technology. 
The Fifth Progress Report (2004) presents the achievements of the Centre as 
follows: 
Among the numerous events the center has organized, specific mention 
should be made of the round tables held on modern technology for the 
exploitation of hard-to-recover oil reserves, implementing advanced 
coal preparation technology in Russia, the technology regulation of 
power plants to assure the stability of the grid, the EU experience of 
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promoting renewable energies and its relevance for Russia, and a round 
table energy efficiency and renewable energies in buildings. 
With respect to investment promotion, the Center also organized a workshop 
with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on project financing 
(Fifth Progress Report, 2004). Furthermore, the round tables served to 
the harmonization of technical norms and standards in electricity sector, 
on the legal framework for the refining industry and for the use of 
renewable energies, on advanced technology for the safety of 
underground coal mining and on the possible participation of EU 
business in the Russian domestic gas market” (Sixth Progress Report, 
2005). 
The second achievement of EU-Russia Energy Dialogue is the building of 
the pipeline system in Northern Europe. Starting from the First Synthesis Report, 
each progress report has focused on the establishment of new strategic transport 
infrastructure, which would be beneficial for both parties. North European Gas 
Pipeline project, which connects Russian gas directly to Europe, has been 
recognized as a priority project during the dialogue and its construction started in 
2005 and is expected to end in 2010. 
The third achievement is the signing and the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by Russia in 2005. This will help cooperation more on energy efficiency, 
use of renewables, and clean coal technology.  
Finally, EU-Russia Energy Dialogue contributed to Russia taking more 
measures in maritime safety. In 2003, Russia banned the transport of heavy oil in 
single hull tankers and strengthened its checks on tankers that discharge in its ports 
(Fifth Progress Report, 2004).  
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Yet, EU-Russia Energy Dialogue is not without problems. Although there 
have been some achievements, the progress has been slow. The most important 
reason for this is Russia’s unwillingness to fully open its energy markets. By the 
monopolies of the state owned companies in energy, Russia can promote its 
strategic and economic interests in the Eurasian region and in the international 
arena. With the opening of its energy market, Russia will be unable to control 
energy policy in a way that will promote its strategic political and economic 
interests. This is why Russia is unwilling to open its market to foreign investments 
which slows down the progress of the dialogue. Moreover, the dialogue involves a 
host of participants as private and state controlled companies. These actors usually 
have their own agenda and this often conflicts with the decision of the Russian 
government and the EU, which is one of the factors that retard the progress (Grant 
and Barysch, 2003). 
 
 
3.3.1.2.2 The Euro- Mediterranean Energy Partnership 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a part of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, the starting point of which was the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 that 
pointed out the need to create an area of peace, stability, shared prosperity, an 
economic area of free trade and a development of economic and financial 
cooperation. To achieve these objectives, the partnership was developed around 
three axes: first is the politics/security, second is the economy/finance and the third 
is society/culture. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership comprises 35 members, 25 
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EU Member States and 10 Mediterranean Partners, which are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
Energy was central to economy and finance and to recall the importance of the 
energy dimension, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership on energy was adapted in 
Trieste Conference in June 7-9 1996.  
There are several reasons why such a partnership was established between 
the parties. For the EU, first of all, the region is important in the sense of its 
geographical proximity to Europe and thus its being a transit route for energy 
(Kagiannas et al., 2003: 2668). Second, the region possesses a considerable amount 
of oil and gas reserves, which is important for EU energy security and the EU 
objective of energy diversification. However, with the economic development in the 
region, energy consumption is expected to increase which means the potential 
energy resources will be used for domestic consumption rather than export. Being 
aware of this fact, EU, by the energy partnership, aims to provide financial 
assistance and technology transfer to the region, which will encourage energy 
efficiency and development of renewables. “This process will help rein in excessive 
growth, in domestic energy demand and increase the energy available for export to 
Europe” (Kagiannas et al., 2003: 2668). The EU assistance is also important for the 
Mediterranean Partners (MPs), because by energy efficiency, those countries will be 
able to save and thus export more resources to EU, whereby they will generate more 
revenues for their economies (Kagiannas et al., 2003: 2669). Therefore, there is a 
mutual interest between the parties to develop the partnership. 
Based on this mutual interest, the fields of cooperation in the energy sector, 
as specified in the Trieste Conference, aims to create the appropriate conditions for 
investments in energy sector and combat climate change (Petroleum Economist, 
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2003). The fields of cooperation in the Trieste Conference are specified as energy 
policy, which will build a consistent approach between the parties; infrastructure 
and networks, which will develop energy networks; industrial cooperation and 
Research and Technological Development to promote technology and investments, 
and energy efficiency (Petroleum Economist, 2003).  
In 1998, at the Brussels Ministerial Conference of energy ministers, the 
objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership are defined as:  
- security of supply, through the development and diversification of 
energy resources and through closer international cooperation, taking 
account of the complementarity between producer, transit and consumer 
countries in the Mediterranean basin and their mutual benefits;  
- competitiveness, in particular with a view to the free trade area which 
it is proposed to create by 2010 and through greater industry 
cooperation, taking account of the different economic and social 
conditions from one country to other; 
- protection of the environment, while ensuring safe and clean 
production, transportation and use of energy and encouraging energy 
efficiency and renewable energy (Annex 2, Euro-Mediterranean Energy 
Forum priorities for 2003-2006). 
In 2000, at the Grenada Forum, the priorities of the energy policy are agreed. 
These are: 
- reform of the legislative and regulatory energy sector frameworks of 
the Mediterranean partners (MP); 
- restructuring of the energy industry of the Mediterranean partners; 
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- convergence of the energy policy of the EU and the Mediterranean 
partners; 
- integration of the Mediterranean energy market and strengthening 
competition; 
- development of interconnections, in particular South – South; 
- the promotion of renewable energy sources in the framework of 
sustainable development (Annex 2, Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum 
priorities for 2003-2006). 
 
Although the objectives and the priorities of the Forum are clearly specified, 
in implementation, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership has been 
unsuccessful so far. There are multiple reasons: the reemerging of the Middle East 
problems in 1997 and 2002, thus the outbreak of the violence, the different 
perceptions of priorities between the EU and MPs, the perceptions of EU acts as 
interference to the internal affairs of the MPs, the different country profiles of the 
MPs and thus difficulty of adopting single policy (Kagiannas et al., 2003: 2682). 
Since 2004, the Mediterranean Partners are also included in the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), under which a new agenda of political and economic 
reforms for short and medium terms are established. The Action Plans between the 
EU and each partner set out the agenda to which energy is included. In that way, the 
design of policy in line with each country’s internal situation might be possible. The 
Action Plans of each country is not going to be analyzed in details here. Yet, the 
common points of the energy agenda of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and 
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Egypt9 in the Action Plans will be underlined. First of all, the adoption of energy 
policy, which converges with EU energy policy objectives, is the main aim.  This 
means that these states are expected to respect to security of supply, 
competitiveness and sustainability in their policies. Such a policy is also in line with 
the EU’s aim of creating a pan-European market around itself.  Second, the EU 
proposes convergence towards the principles of EU internal electricity and gas 
markets. This will require the implementation of organizational, institutional, 
regulatory and technical policies. Third, the EU tries to promote energy efficiency 
and the use of renewable energy sources. Designing of new Action Plans and 
institutions, and increasing the share of renewables by setting targets are the 
proposed policies. Finally, the Action Plans propose reinforcing and developing of 
energy networks and infrastructure. Reducing electricity network losses and 
improving their performance, safety and security; developing new networks, 
infrastructures and interconnections with neighboring countries and with the EU, 
and electrification of rural areas are the key policies to reinforce energy networks. 
In conclusion, by the EU-Mediterranean Energy Partnership, the EU tries to 
impart its energy policy and its model to the Mediterranean region. Thus, it can be 
assumed that for the EU the implication of its energy policy model in the region- 
security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability- will enhance EU energy 
security. The EU-Mediterranean Energy Partnership tries to achieve this objective. 
The problems of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which are mentioned above, 
can be overcome by the new ENP initiative.  Due to its state-based approach, ENP 
and the Action Plans will probably improve the Euro-Mediterranean Energy 
                                                
9
 These countries are the only states which are the members of the EU-Mediterranean Partnership 
and which have Action Plans under the ENP at the same time. 
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Partnership, and will contribute to better apply the objectives decided in the 
Partnership. 
 
 
3.3.1.2.3 INOGATE 
 
“INOGATE stands for Interstate Oil and Gas Transfer to Europe” 
(http://www.inogate.org/en/, last accessed on 25 July 2007). Institutionalized in 
1995, INOGATE is “a dynamic cooperation programme for enhancing security of 
energy supply in the EU and participating countries in Eastern Europe, the 
Caucasus and Central Asia” (http://www.inogate.org/en/, last accessed on 25 July 
2007). The participating countries of the Programme are Albania, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Greece, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, 
Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. INOGATE aims at the 
creation of the integration of the pipeline systems within the region and with the 
EU. It also acts as an institution to attract private investors and international 
financial institutions. In that sense, INOGATE is similar to EU-Russia energy 
dialogue since both aims to attract European investment in the region, in return for 
the energy cooperation with the EU (Bahgat, 2005: 23).  
Funded by EU’s Tacis Regional Cooperation Programme, INOGATE tries 
to enhance security of supply of both the EU and the participating countries. It 
succeeds this by focusing on physical security of supply and strategic and 
commercial aspects of security of supply. The former refers to the security of 
existing pipeline infrastructure, most of which is old and need investment to be 
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improved. INOGATE’s financial aid to the participating countries has been 
beneficial to this last point (http://www.inogate.org/inogate/en/about/context, last 
accessed on 25 July 2007). INOGATE is also planning to improve a regional 
monitoring system to control the operation of gas transit pipelines and underground 
gas storage facilities. 
Yet, the more important role of the Programme is in developing new transit 
routes between the Caspian region and Europe. There are three important role that 
INOGATE tries to achive in this issue. Firstly, “INOGATE helps to define and 
promote common interest projects between the EU and INOGATE Participating 
Countries” (http://www.inogate.org/inogate/en/about/context, last accessed on 25 
July 2007). Secondly, about financing of the projects, “INOGATE helps 
participating countries in preparing the necessary dossiers for the financing of 
bankable projects” (http://www.inogate.org/inogate/en/about/context, last accessed 
on 25 July 2007). Third, the Programme improves the institutional and legal basis 
of the cooperation. This is done by the INOGATE Umbrella Agreement, which 
came into force in February 2001. “The agreement sets out an institutional and legal 
system designed to rationalize and facilitate the development of interstate oil and 
gas transportation and operation” (Bahgat, 2005: 23). 
Although the Programme has not been so successful in developing 
alternative energy routes so far10, it has had important contributions in several areas. 
The construction and modernization of gas metering stations, upgrades of 
underground gas storage stations, supporting of know-how, completion of the 
INOGATE Investment Attraction Action are the most important projects that 
INOGATE has achieved. 
                                                
10
 For twelve years, the only pipeline Project that is realized from Caspian to West was the  BTC. 
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Overall, the INOGATE Programme “has proved a useful vehicle for EU 
investment over the past decade by backing a number of projects in areas such as 
energy trade and modernization of gas transport routes” (Kalyuzhonava, 2005: 72). 
Finally, it should be noted that, unlike the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue, and the 
EU-Mediterranean Partnership, INOGATE does not focus on broader energy issues, 
such as environment or competitiveness. Rather, the focus of the Programme is 
more concentrated on the security of pipeline systems and the enhancing security of 
supply by establishing new pipelines.  
 
 
3.4 Interpretations 
 
To reach the energy security objectives of “reliable, sustainable, affordable 
energy supplies and to consider environmental concerns”, the EU considers three 
things in its energy policy: security of supply, competitiveness and sustainability. 
Security of supply includes the policies of diversification, and energy 
dialogues/partnerships with producers. In other words, security of supply considers 
mostly third party relationships. Competitiveness, in the first phase, refers to the 
establishment of a single European energy market. In the second phase, it also aims 
to open neighboring regions’ and countries’ energy markets, by which the creation 
of the pan-European energy market will be possible. Sustainability is mostly about 
climate change and using environmentally friendly energy resources, which will 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This chapter showed how the three aspects of EU 
energy security understanding are reflected in EU policies. As the aim of the thesis 
is to understand the central motivation behind EU energy security policies and to 
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interpret EU energy security behavior in the light of an IR theory (rationalist-neo-
realist or constructivist), EU policies on which a theoretical interpretation can be 
adapted will be summarized in this part.  
First of all, the EU avoids the consumption of nuclear and coal because of 
these resources’ environmental problems. Coal generates pollution at every stage of 
production, which results in huge CO2 emissions and thus contributes to global 
warming and climate change. As the EU has strong commitments in reducing 
greenhouse gases, and as coal produces this gas in a great extent, the coal 
consumption is decreasing in the Union, although this resource provides 
diversification and is cheap. 
As for nuclear, although it does not change climate negatively, it has its own 
environmental problems, such as threatening human health and environment by 
nuclear wastes, and the possibility of nuclear plants’ explosion. These are the 
reasons why many EU member states have decided to phase out the nuclear power 
plants. This means, nuclear’s share in total consumption will decrease, despite the 
fact that nuclear does not produce CO2 when burned, it contributes to indigenous 
production and makes the EU less dependent on foreign supplies. 
Second, natural gas’ share is increasing and will increase in the future. The 
most important reason of this is natural gas’ low carbon emission levels that means 
it is an environmentally friendly resource. The opportunity to use it in the large 
sectors as power generation and heating also widens its consumption. Yet, natural 
gas creates dependence to exporters and it makes the Union more dependent on 
Russia, which, in turn undermines EU energy security. However, despite this fact, 
natural gas’ consumption will increase in the future and will make it the primary 
energy resource, due to its low carbon emission levels. 
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Third, the EU is trying to enhance the use of renewables and makes strong 
efforts in this field. Even though the objective to double the use of renewables by 
2012 will probably fall short of the target, EU efforts to promote investment, 
technology and to enlighten national and local rulers about renewables signify that 
in the mid to long term, the consumption of renewable energy resources will 
increase. 
Fourth, the EU sets the objective of diversification of energy suppliers and 
transit routes to increase its energy security. As the import dependency in natural 
gas is the greatest, and the situation will be worse in the future, the diversification 
of natural gas routes is crucial. The most important potential suppliers of gas are in 
the Central Asia, the Middle East and the North Africa. By energy partnerships, the 
EU is planning to build new energy corridors in these regions, whereby increasing 
gas transfer will be possible. The EU also wants to export its own model of opening 
markets and respecting the environment to the countries of the region. This will 
make the gas transfer in the region easier and thus will increase EU energy security. 
Fifth, the EU tries to impose environmental regulations to the regions’ 
countries. In the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, in the Euro-Mediterranean Energy 
Partnership and in the ENP, the reduction of CO2 emissions is set as a common 
concern. For this reason, the EU pushes the regions’ states to adopt regulations in 
the environment, such the Kyoto Protocol, to set renewable targets for the short 
term and to pay attention on energy efficiency. The signing and ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol by Russia, for instance, was a result of EU initiatives. This was 
mostly the consequence of EU diplomacy and the successful use of the economic 
instruments available to the Union (Vogler, 2005: 849). In order to persuade Russia 
 66
to ratify the Protocol, “the EU promised that it would push for the inclusion of 
Russia in the WTO” (Scheipers, Sicurelli, 2007: 447). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EU ENERGY SECURITY BEHAVIOR 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to answer the research question of this study: is 
EU energy policy primarily based on its norms or is it based on its material 
interests? This task will be accomplished by commenting on the energy security 
policies that are defined in Chapter 3. By answering the research question, this 
chapter will also make it clear that how EU energy security policy can be 
interpreted by rationalism-neo-realism and constructivism. Accordingly, while the 
policies, which are based on material interests, will be explained by rationalism-
neo-realism in this study; the norm-based policies will be interpreted by 
constructivism. Here, it should be noted that rationalism and neo-realism are two 
different perspectives, although they have common premises in explaining the 
policies of the actors. Yet, as rationalism is a general perspective, and might include 
other theories like neo-liberalism, which also focuses on norms from a different 
perspective than constructivism, to not create inconsistencies in answering the 
normative side of the research question, only neo-realism will be analyzed along 
with rationalism while explaining the material interests in policies. On the other 
hand, norms can be studied under various theories in IR, from positivist theories of 
neo-liberalism as just indicated, to post-positivist theories of normative theory.  
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However, in this study, it will be studied under constructivism. The reason why 
constructivism is chosen to explain norms will be given below. 
It should also be notified that, this study, like most of the literature works, 
sees environment, democracy and good governance, and human right policies as the 
norms of the EU (Smith, 2005; Vogler and Bretherton, 2006; Manners, 2002: 241, 
Manners, 2005: 11). 
The chapter starts first with the analysis of rationalism and neo-realism, 
which is followed by an analysis of constructivism. Next, the policies of the Union 
that are explained in Chapter 3 will be analyzed to determine whether they are 
based on material-interests or norms. This will give the basic background for the 
concluding analysis, which will be about interpreting those policies to the IR 
theories of rationalism-neo-realism and constructivism. 
 
 
4.1 Rationalist-Neo-Realist Perspective 
 
The aim of this section is to find the most appropriate theory/methodology 
to explain the security behavior that is solely or dominantly based on material 
interest. This theory, which emphasizes the role of interests, should, at the same 
time undermine the role of ideas, identity, norms and culture to find a more clear-
cut answer to the research question of this study.  
The best theory that will explain the role of interests in foreign policy is 
rational-choice theory. In IR context, rationalism refers to the application of rational 
choice theory to IR questions (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 54). The core rational 
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choice assumption is that “when faced with several courses of action, people 
usually do what they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome” (Elster, as 
quoted in Ward, 2006: 25). The rational choice theory assumes that individuals are 
self-interested and they have “all the rational capacity, time and emotional 
detachment necessary to choose the best course of action, no matter how complex 
the choice” (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 68). From this perspective, it can be assumed 
that rational choice theory is basically about finding the reasons for individual’s 
actions. 
As rational choice theory is basically about presenting the reasons of 
individuals’ decisions, rationalism in IR, also tries to put forward the reasons of the 
policies of the actors, mainly nation states. If rational-choice theory is applied to IR, 
then rationalism should be expected to claim that states (or actors) usually do what 
they believe is likely to have the best overall outcome. Here, “the best overall 
outcome” is the problematic side of studying rationalism in IR. The best overall 
outcome can be assumed as interests. Yet, what these interests are, and how they are 
interpreted is the problem of rationalism, since different schools define the content 
of interest differently.11 However, during the development of IR, rationalism is 
usually associated with materialism and the best overall outcomes are defined based 
on material interests (Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 58).12 For this rationalism, the 
policies of actors are based on material interests such as power and wealth 
(Checkel, 1998: 326). Although today there are different interpretations of 
rationalism, as it is not only about reaching the material interest, rather ideas and 
                                                
11
 As for neo-realism, interests are about material capabilities, and they are given. For 
constructivism, interests are rather ideas and are constructed by agents and structures. More details 
will be given below. 
 
12
 Materialism is the view that  “material reality exists, regardless of perception or interpretation, and 
that we know is a faithful representation of reality out there” (Adler, 2000, 111). 
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norms may play important roles in choosing the best overall outcome (Fearon and 
Wendt, 2002; Wendt 1999: passim), in this study rationalism should be restricted. 
As the aim of this section is to find the most appropriate theory that will explain 
interest-based policies, rationalism here will be accepted as the methodology, which 
emphasizes the role of material interests in decision-making.  
This material-rationalism13 has been associated with the IR theories of neo-
realism and neo-liberalism, since these theories also emphasize the importance of 
material capabilities in policy-making procedure. Indeed, in neo-realism, the 
distribution of material capabilities refers to the structure of the system. Yet, in this 
study, neo-liberalism will not be taken as a theory to explain material-rationalist 
policies, since neo-liberalism also focuses on the role of norms in the international 
politics14. As this might create confusion in interpreting norm-based policies, in this 
study material-rationalism will be restricted to neo-realism, which undermines the 
role of norms in international politics. 
Neo-realism is an IR theory, which tries to explain the international politics. 
The leading neo-realist thinker is Kenneth Waltz, and he “seeks to provide a 
scientific explanation of the international political system” (Jackson and Sorensen, 
2000: 85). As Waltz is committed to explain international political system 
scientifically, neo-realism is ontologically objective and is epistemologically based 
on scientific explanations. 
                                                
13
 The concept belongs to the author. It is defined like this to show that in this study rationalism is 
about reaching material interests. 
 
14
 The author is aware of the fact that the norms in neo-liberalism and in constructivism have 
different interpretations. For neo-liberalism, “norms are intervening variables between assumed 
interests and behavioral outcomes” (Katzenstein, 1996: 25). In other words, they help actors to 
maximize interests (Checkel, 1998: 327). In constructivism, conversely, norms are studied in totally 
different perspective which will be shown below. 
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Waltz takes some elements of classical realism as starting point. These can 
be stated as the concept of international anarchy and its central feature of power 
politics (Jackson and Sorensen, 2000: 86). The main actors in the international 
system are states and the main concerns of the states are security and survival. 
However, neo-realism also differs from classical realism in some senses. 
The main explanatory power of neo-realism, for Waltz, comes from its emphasis on 
structure (Waltz, 1991, passim). Since his work of Man, the State and War (1959), 
Waltz seems to have reliance on systemic factors in explaining state and 
international political behavior. In this work, Waltz presented the view that the 
origin of war can best be understood by understanding the nature of the 
international system (Waltz, 1959; 224-237). This approach is reinforced in his 
work of Theory of International Politics (1979). International structure, 
accordingly, is defined by the ordering principle of the system, which is anarchy 
and by the distribution of capabilities across units (Waltz, 1991: 29). He clarifies 
the last point as follows: 
In an anarchic realm, structures are defined in terms of their major units. 
International structures vary with significant changes in the number of 
great powers. Great powers are marked off from the others by the 
combined capabilities they command. When their number changes 
consequentially, the calculations and behaviors of states, and the 
outcomes of their interactions produce vary. (Waltz, 1991: 29-30) 
 
For Waltz, this structural approach of neo-realism is its distinctive feature-at 
least from other realist theories, which concentrate on the actions and interactions of 
units, rather than structural effects (Waltz, 1991: 33). 
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One consequence of this structural approach is that in neo-realism states are 
alike units, because “states are made functionally similar by the constraints of the 
structure”(Waltz, 1991: 36). States “differ only in regard to their greatly varying 
capabilities” (Jackson and Sorensen, 2000: 85). 
Structure also defines the outcomes of the states. “Structure mediates the 
outcomes that states produce” (Waltz, 1991: 36). Waltz believes that neo-realism is 
a theory, which can explain the effects of structure on the behavior and outcomes of 
states (Waltz, 1991: 37). If this is interpreted in another way, it can be said that, 
structure defines the interests and preferences of the agents. In other words, in 
Waltz’s neo-realism, interests are given. 
This structural approach might be interpreted in several ways when the 
decision-making process of the actors is the subject. By focusing on structure and 
by restricting it to a material factor- power- Waltz implicitly assumes that ideas, 
culture and norms have no effect on interest formation and on behavior. As 
indicated above, in neo-realism interests are taken as given and the structure 
specifies the behavior. Assuming the structure as the distribution of material 
capabilities, Waltz implicitly claims that interests are material things. Moreover, as 
structure affects the outcomes and behaviors of the states, the inner conditions of 
the states are trivial in decision-making. Thus, for neo-realism, neither the 
international nor the domestic system has normative content (Katzenstein, 1996: 
25). As structure conditions the behavior of state actors, in neo-realism states have 
largely unvarying, contextual identities and interests (Jepperson, Wendt and 
Katzenstein, 1996: 43). For neo-realism, therefore, culture and identity have no 
explanatory power in the decision-making process (Jepperson, Wendt and 
Katzenstein, 1996: 39, 43). 
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In sum, material interest decisions of actors can best be explained by 
rationalism and neo-realism. Rationalism explains how actors choose the best 
option that serves their material interests. However, as neo-liberalism is also under 
the materialist rationalism, and since it also focuses on the role of norms in the 
decision-making, the material rationalism is restricted to neo-realism in this study. 
Neo-realism excludes the role of ideas, norms, identities and culture in decision-
making process. Rather, it focuses on the role of material capabilities in specifying 
the behavior and outcomes of the agents. Therefore, by focusing on rationalism and 
neo-realism, the study will be able to better understand the energy policies of the 
Union, which are reasoned strictly from material interests. 
 
 
4.2. Constructivism 
 
To explain the roles of the norms in the security decision-making process, 
this study relies on constructivism and the aim of this section is to show why this is 
so. 
The fundamental proposition of constructivism is “human beings are social 
beings, and we would not be human but for our social relations” (Onuf, 1998: 58). 
This means, “social relations make or construct people” (Onuf, 1998: 59). On the 
other hand, the world is also constructed by the people “from the raw materials the 
nature provides, by doing what we do with each other and what we say to each 
other” (Onuf, 1998: 59). In sum, constructivism holds the view that “people make 
society, and society makes people” (Onuf, 1998: 59). 
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Based on these ideas, all constructivists share two understandings: “social 
construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality”(Guzzini, as quoted 
in Adler, 2002: 95). This means, “the objects of our knowledge are not independent 
of our interpretations and our language” (Adler, 2002: 95). Thus, unlike neo-
realism, constructivism ontologically holds the view that there is not an objective 
world out there, but rather social world is inter-subjective. Moreover, as the world is 
made of social relations, nothing is given. Interests, in that sense, are constructed by 
social practices. 
As in neo-realism, constructivists believe that structure exists. Yet, they 
believe that this structure is socially constructed and is not solely material. Material 
structure also exists in constructivism, as long as the agents construct it in that 
sense. Therefore, structure in constructivism is not the distribution of material 
capabilities, but it is the construction of social actors. Thus, fundamental to 
constructivism is that the structure is not independent of the agents, which construct 
it. In other words, in constructivism, there is a mutual constitution between agents 
and structures. “Constructivism locates actors in social structure that both 
constitutes those actors and is constituted by their interaction” (Farrell, 2002: 50). 
Thus, change in structure does not depend on change in material power, but rather, 
it depends on the “emergence of new constitutive rules, the evolution and 
transformation of new social structures” (Adler, 2002: 102). 
As constructivism focuses on the social world, social practices as norms, 
identities and culture become crucial in decision-making process. This does not 
mean that constructivists ignore the importance of interests in politics. Rather, 
interests are effective; yet, they are also constructed by social practices. In other 
words, norms give interests their content and meaning (Adler, 2002, 103). 
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Moreover, norms also have independent explanatory power of decisions. In the 
constructivist literature, norm is defined as the “collective expectations about proper 
behavior for a given identity” (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1996; Checkel, 1998; 
Farrell, 2002). Katzenstein, Jepperson and Wendt separate norms into two: the 
constitutive norms “operate like rules defining an identity”, and the regulative 
norms “operate as standards proper enactment or a deployment of a defined 
identity”(Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 54). Thus, understanding norms 
of the actors becomes crucial in understanding the reasons for their actions, since 
norms establish actors’ interests and identities. 
In sum, constructivism brings a different perspective to IR, by not taking the 
world as given, but by focusing on the inter-subjective world. In that sense it helps 
explain why people converge around norms and identities, how the structure change 
as the new constitutive rules are formed and how structures and agents are in 
interaction and constitute each other (Adler, 2000, 95-113). 
 
 
4.3. The Analysis of EU Energy Security Policy  
 
 
4.3.1. EU Energy Security Behavior: Exploring the Central 
Motivation  
  
In Chapter3, EU energy security policy is analyzed. In the end of the 
Chapter, the most significant energy policies are underlined to be able to better 
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analyze them. This section will interpret these policies and will put forward which 
policies are based on norms of the EU and which ones are based on material 
interests. Combined with the theoretical discussion that has been made above, this 
task will help analyze how EU energy security policy can be interpreted by 
rationalist-neo-realist perspective or on constructivism. 
 The first policy that was mentioned at the end of the Chapter 3 was EU 
avoidance of the consumption of nuclear and coal energy, and thus the relative 
increase in the consumption of natural gas, for environmental reasons. This is 
certainly a normative act, because by not using nuclear and coal, the EU 
undermines one of its energy security goals of diversifying resource types. If the EU 
followed a material interest based policy, it would not mitigate using these 
resources, since the consumption of these resources would enhance the energy 
security of the Union by increasing indigenous production and by not making 
Europe more dependent on natural gas, which is mostly supplied by imports. 
Moreover, if the EU used more coal, it would pay less for the natural gas imports, 
since coal is cheaper than the natural gas. Furthermore, as mentioned in the Green 
Paper of 2000, coal has a relatively more stable and established international 
market. This means that in imports of coal there is a lower risk of supply disruption. 
Also, as coal is situated in many countries and as it can be transferred easily 
overseas, the risks associated to its trade is much lower than the natural gas. Despite 
the presence of these advantages of coal, the EU prefers to rely on natural gas for 
environmental reasons. In that sense, it would be wrong to assume that the EU 
chooses the best option that would serve its material interests. By relying more on 
natural gas, the EU pays more money, risks consistent supply, and is more 
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dependent on Russia.  Thus, the only factor, which can explain the situation, is the 
presence and implication of norms in EU energy security policy. 
 The presence of norms can also be seen in the fact that nuclear energy’s 
share is also expected to decrease, although nuclear does not harm the environment 
in the way fossil resources do. The only problem in decreasing nuclear’s share in 
overall energy consumption seems to be the nuclear waste problem and the risk of 
nuclear reactor explosion. As both of these situations are also related to the 
environment and human health, the avoidance of nuclear energy is also a norm-
based policy. 
 A rationalist may assume that protecting the environment is for the interest 
of the EU and, in the long-term, protecting the environment is a much more 
important interest than not using coal in the short term, because environmental 
problems might cause serious troubles both concerning economy and survival. It 
cannot be guaranteed that in a hundred years time most of the icebergs will not melt 
down and some parts of Europe will not stay under water. Or the climate will 
change in a way that European economy will collapse. These predictions cannot be 
falsified and it is true that protecting the environment is more important than the 
short-term interests. However, the efforts of the EU to protect the environment have 
little effects globally, and unless the other major consumers, such as the USA, 
China and India do follow the same environmental regulations that the EU does, EU 
policies will have small effects in worldwide. Despite being aware of this fact, the 
EU still avoids the consumption of coal and implements regulations to fight the 
climate change. This is why EU policy of not using coal and instead relying more 
on natural gas can be interpreted as a norm-based policy.  
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A policy that may be interpreted as being based more on interests is the 
EU’s efforts of spreading and imposing environmental regulations to the neighbor 
countries. Certainly, as the environment is a EU norm and the EU has strong 
commitments in protecting the environment, spreading these regulations is norm 
diffusion and has normative content. Yet, as it is mentioned above, environmental 
regulations gain meaning if they are adopted globally. In that sense, by spreading it 
to the regions’ countries- such as South East Europe, North Africa, Russia, 
Mediterranean countries- the EU may want to increase the number of countries, 
which respect the environment. Thus, the environment policy will gain more 
meaning in global context, and in the long term it would be to EU interest; since, as 
other countries, the EU will be affected less by the environmental problems, and 
therefore its interests would not be harmed. Thus, norm diffusion in the 
environment has both normative and interest based reasons.  
Another policy, which has both normative and interest based reasons is the 
EU effort to increase the use of renewables. Renewables may have been defined as 
“priority” by EU in 2000 Green Paper for three reasons: first, they contribute to the 
environmental protection policies by not producing any harmful gas for atmosphere 
or harmful waste to the environment; second, by contributing to indigenous 
production, and thus by making it less dependent on the fossil resources’ imports; 
third by providing diversification of resources. The first is again related to 
environmental protection and therefore is about norms. Yet, the second and the third 
considers the diversification of resources and increasing energy security by 
enhancing indigenous production, whereby EU will be less dependent on the 
imports from unstable regions, and the increase of renewable would mean more 
stable energy. This is a rational choice in terms of maximizing the material interests 
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as enhancing energy security, thus the power of the country and increasing the 
wealth by paying less on foreign energy resources. 
The only policy that can be linked only to interest-based reasoning, is the 
EU’s imports from the countries, which are considered as undemocratic and 
disrespectful to human rights. As it is indicated in the second chapter the main 
country supplying oil to the EU is currently Russia and the largest region is the 
Middle East. In gas, the EU is largely dependent on Russia, and Algeria is the third 
main gas supplier to Europe.  
On the other side of the coin, democracy and good governance, and human 
rights protection are among the EU’s main foreign policy objectives (Smith, 2005), 
and these are also the norms of the EU (Manners, 2005: 11). In most of its relations 
with third parties the EU gives importance to the application of these norms by third 
parties.15 In other words, the EU tries to diffuse its norms. Yet, this normative 
action is lacking when it comes to the EU’s energy imports. Most of the countries 
from which the EU imports are neither democratic nor respect human rights, in the 
EU’s definition.16 This can be better understood by looking at EU oil import data. 
In 2005, the ten countries doing the most oil exports to Europe are in order 
Russia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Nigeria, Iraq and 
Mexico (http://ec.europa.eu/energy/oil/crude/index_en.htm, last accessed on 23 
                                                
15
 Examples can be multiplied. In Balkans, for example, the EU is trying to establish the democracy 
and good governments, human rights, by implying a ‘carrots and sticks’ policy to the region 
countries. It proposes a conditionality, which requires that, as long as the South East European states 
adopt necessary regulations in these topics they get awarded either financially or economically by 
the EU. 
 
16
 In 1998, the EU described the democratic principles as “the election of a country’s leaders by free 
universal suffrage in a secret ballot, existence of clear cut rules apply to all citizens without 
discrimination, the promotion and protection of fundamental freedoms, institutional arrangements 
for participation in decision making and development of choices at national, regional, and local 
level, political and institutional pluralism, reflected by a free and open political system, transparency 
and integrity of institutions” (Smith, 2005, 132-133).   
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August 2007). Without attempting to discuss to discuss the internal democratization 
level of these countries, based on the EU definition, eight out of these ten countries 
(except Norway and Mexico) are not democratic. The conclusion is that roughly 
80% of EU oil imports are from non-democratic countries.17 Moreover, when these 
eight countries’ share is calculated, it will be seen that they established almost two-
thirds of EU crude oil imports in 2005 (Europa, 2007). 
 A norm-based decision, on the other hand, should have restricted the 
imports from those countries or at least warned them to follow more democratic 
principles. However, this is lacking in EU energy policy. What is more, the EU is 
still trying to diversify supply sources coming from the countries which do not 
respect human rights or which are not democratic.  Projected gas pipeline from 
Nigeria, Central Asian countries and Russia are the examples of this. Thus, it is 
clear that in diversifying the geographical origin of resources and in energy imports 
material interest of the EU is dominant and superior to its normative values of 
human rights and democracy.  
However, this last point may be defended on the ground that the EU has no 
alternative option other than importing from these countries. Most of the world’s 
gas reserves are situated in Russia and most of the oil is in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the EU cannot meet its energy consumption by relying on other 
suppliers, since those countries’ resources would not be sufficient to supply the total 
EU consumption. This is not wrong. However, if this is the case, then the EU’s 
actions can more easily be interpreted on neo-realist grounds. If the structure is the 
distribution of material capability, energy structure will be the distribution of energy 
                                                
 
17
 It is approximate because, as exporters after the first ten are included to the list, the non-
democratic countries’ share will increase.  
 81
resources in the world. As energy resources are mostly in the hands of “non-
democratic” countries, it is the structure, which causes the outcome of EU policy 
decision and EU behavior in energy policy. Structure does not let the EU import 
from other countries and thus the EU behaves in the non-normative basis and act as 
a rationalist (in the sense that when faced with many choices, the actors choose the 
best one which serves their interests) since there is no other viable alternative for 
the EU that structure proposes.  
 
 
4.3.2. EU Energy Security Behavior: Theoretical Interpretations 
 
 In Chapter 2, it was shown that the EU has a broad energy security 
understanding. This statement was reached after analyzing EU energy security 
definition, which, differently than the literature, takes the environment as a referent-
object of its energy security. In Chapter 3, it was shown that in its internal policies 
the EU respects environmental regulations. One will see this by analyzing EU 
energy situation, in which the share of high pollutant coal is expected to decrease 
and the oil’s increase will be relatively low compared to cleaner natural gas. 
Moreover, the EU is committed to the Kyoto Protocol, which foresees the reduction 
of CO2 emissions. Last, but not least, the EU is also trying to enforce the 
environmental regulations on other countries, as it is evident in Russia’s ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
 The broadened security understanding and EU policies on the environment 
might have different motivations. Yet, in this chapter it was shown that EU policies 
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on the environment have generally normative content. Moreover, these norm-based 
actions are not reasoned from interest-maximization logic, as neo-liberals would 
assume, because they are sometimes taken at the expense of interests. Thus, in this 
study, environmental norms in EU energy policy are interpreted from a 
constructivist perspective. As it has been signified above, in constructivist literature 
norms are “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given 
identity”(Katzenstein, 1996). Identity, on the other hand, can simply be described as 
“we-feeling” (Adler, 2000: 104). Therefore, the environmental regulations in 
Europe are adapted because it is the proper behavior for European identity. 
 However, this norm-based understanding cannot be applied in the supply 
security policies of the EU. As the energy policy with third countries is a part of 
foreign policy, in the energy relationship with suppliers, a normative actor should 
be expected to follow foreign policy norms. For the EU, democracy and good 
governance, human rights are some of these foreign policy norms (Manners, 2005: 
11), and the EU frequently emphasizes these norms with its relations toward other 
countries. For instance, these norms are pre-conditions for accession countries to be 
a member or to make pre-accession states ready to move up to be accession states. 
However, in energy trade and in energy imports these norms are not considered by 
the EU. The non-compliance with these foreign policy norms of the EU is not a 
preventive factor for the EU in importing energy. The EU largely imports its energy 
from “non-democratic” countries, which also disrespect human rights in EU 
terms.18 This shows that, in energy trade the EU thinks its material-interests before 
its norms. Indeed, norms have no explanatory power in energy trade. Thus the EU 
act, in this case, can be explained by rationalism and neo-realism since it chooses 
                                                
18
 In this case, the EU can be compared with the USA. As in the case of Iran, the US might give up 
importing energy from countries, which do not comply with the US’ or international norms.  
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the option, which will serve best to its material interests. Moreover, the lack of 
norms in energy trade also shows that this rationalistic model excludes neo-
liberalism and is based on neo-realism, which downplays the explanatory role of the 
norms in decision-making process. Also, as indicated above, energy structure leads 
the EU to not behave normatively, since the EU has no option other than importing 
from these “non-democratic” states. Thus, a rationalist-neo-realist approach is the 
best perspective, which will explain EU supply security behavior. 
 In sum, different motives of EU energy security behavior can be interpreted 
differently by constructivism and rationalist-neo-realism. Whereas in environmental 
policy the EU takes action based on its norms because it is seen as proper behavior 
for European identity, in the policies concerning energy imports, the EU gives 
superiority to its material-interests rather than its norms. This means that, where 
constructivism can better explain the environmental side of EU energy security 
behavior, rationalism and neo-realism can better explain its supply security part. 
 
 84
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis aimed to explore the central motivation behind EU energy 
security policy. More specifically, it targeted the question of whether EU energy 
security policy is based on its norms or its interests. Theoretically normative 
policies are interpreted by constructivism and interest-based policies are interpreted 
by rationalism and neo-realism. In light of the analysis of EU energy security 
definition, its internal and external energy security policies, this thesis reached to 
three main conclusions. 
First, the EU has a broadened energy security understanding, which is 
reached by the comparison of the literature’s definition of energy security and the 
EU’s definition of energy security. Accordingly, in the literature, energy security 
basically refers to supply security that emphasizes the conditions by which supply 
security will be achieved easily and affordably. Therefore, energy security 
definition of the literature is “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies” (IEA, 
2003). In EU context, on the other hand, there is an additional emphasize on the 
environment and sometimes on individuals. Green Paper of 2000 (Green Paper, 
2000) defines energy security as follows: 
… to ensure, for the well-being of its citizens and for the proper 
functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of 
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energy products on the market at a affordable price for all consumers, 
whilst respecting environmental concerns and looking towards 
sustainable development. 
Taking the environment to the energy security definition, the EU makes the 
environment a referent-object of its energy security. What follows from this, is the 
fact that the EU has a broadened energy security understanding in the sense that not 
only the security of traditional referent objects such  as states is important but also 
the security of the environment and implicitly the security of individiuals are also 
important for EU energy security.  
Second, the environmental policies of the EU can be interpreted by 
constructivism, since the central motivation behind environmental regulations are 
norms and the norms are not applied only to maximize material interests as neo-
liberals argue. Rather norms are implemented because they are found appropriate, 
and they establish the proper behavior for European identity. This is not to say that 
all of the policies related to environement are only the result of the norms. To the 
contrary, some environmetal policies also reflect the interests of the EU, such as 
using more renewables by which indigenous production will increase, and EU 
supply security will be enhanced. However, all of these enviromental policies have 
normative background. In the renewables, for instance, the consumption of 
renewables will make the use of fossil resources decrease, which will mean less 
pollution. Thus, in the environment, norms are dominant to interests in energy 
security decision-making process. 
Finally, in security of supply, EU actions can best be explained by 
rationalist-neo-realist perspective. Rationalism in this thesis referred to situations in 
which actors  pick the decision that best serves to their material interests, when 
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confronted with various options. Neo-realism, at the same time, referred to policies 
where there is no role of norms in decision-making process and where structure 
dictates the behavior of the actors. The EU’s energy imports from countries, which 
do not respect EU foreign policy norms of democracy and human rights led to the 
conclusion that material interests - in this case secure energy supplies- are superior 
to policy norms. One might ask what could be the alternative for the EU when most 
of the reserves are situated in “non-democratic” countries. In this case, it can be 
assumed that structure specifies EU behavior in energy imports and thus neo-
realism is the best explaining factor of EU security of supply policy. However, it 
should not be forgotten that the USA could stop its energy trade with Iran, since the 
latter does not comply with international norms. Thus, the EU could also take some 
normative action regarding the supply security if it privileges norms in its supply 
security. 
In conclusion, in environmental policies the EU is strongly committed to its 
norms. In this topic, the EU thinks its norms before its material interests and even 
takes actions which conflict with its material interests. This norm-based behavior is 
interpreted by constructivism in this thesis, since the reason of this normative action 
is not to maximize interests by relying on norms as neo-liberals argue, but is the 
acceptance of the environment as a norm by agents and structures in the EU. In 
other words, the environment is constructed as a norm in the EU. However, it would 
be wrong to assume that EU energy security behavior is normative only looking at 
the environment. Although the EU is the most committed actor to the environment 
in the world, a fully normative approach is still lacking in EU energy security 
behavior. Especially, in supply security polices, the EU thinks its material interests 
before its norms. This is evident in EU energy trade, which is mostly with the 
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countries, which are considered as “non-democratic” and disrespectful to human 
rights. Thus, to be a normative actor in energy, the EU should take more normative 
actions in the supply security policies as energy embargoes or official warnings 
against the highly undemocratic exporter countries. 
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